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Abstract
The fi rst experimental work on practical radar 
detection in the USSR was done in 1934, to detect an 
airplane in fl ight as a target for fl ak or antiaircraft artillery. 
This work was absolutely independent of radar research 
and development in other countries. The outline of the 
fi rst work on radar development in the USSR is briefl y 
described in this paper on the basis of generalizations of 
documents, articles, and books published earlier (mostly in 
Russian). The attention in this paper will also be focused 
on the original radar research and development in Ukraine, 
which was then a part of the USSR. The fi rst three-coordinate 
radar system was developed in 1938 in Kharkiv, the capital 
of Soviet Ukraine in the 1919-1934 period. Earlier, in the 
1920s, the fi rst powerful UHF and microwave oscillators 
were also created in Kharkiv, including magnetrons, which 
served as key engineering components of the future radar 
systems. Later, many important achievements were made 
in Ukraine, such as wideband signal generation, and pulse 
compression using a matched fi lter, in the middle of the 
1950s. Radar development in modern Ukraine was based 
on its powerful scientifi c schools and industry.
1. Introduction
Modern radar can be defi ned as the science and technology encompassing the methods and 
means of detection, coordinate measurement, recognition, 
and determination of the motion parameters and other 
characteristics of observed objects using refl ection, re-
radiation, or emission of electromagnetic waves. The 
possibility of detecting objects using electromagnetic waves 
was expressed at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
but was prepared by earlier work.
It is worth mentioning James Maxwell’s brilliant 
theory; the works by Heinrich Hertz, who tested and 
experimentally proved key results of Maxwell’s theory; 
experiments on wireless communications in the Baltic Sea 
by Alexander S. Popov, who noted in his report that radio 
communication established between two ships was subject 
to the interference due to refl ection from a third ship when 
it passed between them; foresight articles and lectures by 
Nikola Tesla; and Guglielmo Marconi’s wireless devices. 
Many other achievements can be considered as forerunners 
of radar. However, the fi rst working device that directly 
implemented the basic principle of active monostatic 
radar was built by Christian Huelsmeyer, to detect river 
boats at a distance. It was patented in 1904 in Germany, 
and named Telemobiloskop. Huelsmeyer’s invention had 
no commercial success then, and it was pretty quickly 
forgotten. He was ahead of his time.
The creation of modern radar was gradually prepared 
by the general level of science and technology, and the 
needs of society. Only in the thirties of the twentieth 
century did the technical and economic, as well as the 
social and military conditions, appear and coincide for the 
development of practical radar. That is why it is not too 
strange that almost in parallel and independently, purposeful 
research on the creation of radar devices was started at least 
in France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, the Soviet Union (the USSR), and USA. 
Normally, Sir R. A. Watson-Watt is pointed to as one of the 
key founders of the fi rst real radar technology. In July 1935, 
together with his colleagues, he successfully demonstrated 
a radar for detecting an aircraft, and for estimating its 
coordinates. After improvements, a radar network (Chain 
Home) based on this system was built to provide early 
detection of enemy aircraft.
The activities in the fi eld of radar performed in the 
USSR were published later than in other countries. They 
were less accessible to Western historians of science, and 
were often not considered by them. In this work, more 
attention is therefore paid to the history of radar in the 
former Soviet Union and Ukraine, without intending to 
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claim stronger advances and priority. In reality, these 
works can be considered to be quite fundamental and, in 
certain aspects, pioneering. They were done in isolation 
and without publicity, caused by the pre-war circumstances 
and the general Soviet “spy-mania.” All the investigations 
in this fi eld were heavily classifi ed as Top Secret.
Up to the 1930s, for air defense, acoustic direction 
fi nders together with optical range fi nders were used to 
determine the aircraft’s location. They were able to quite 
accurately determine the direction-of-arrival of the sound 
emitted by the aircraft’s engine. Such a system was called 
“prozhzvuk,” which is actually an abbreviation of two 
words in Russian: “searchlight” and “sound.” Such a system 
could be used only with a cloudless sky. Even then, it had 
negligible effi  ciency, as the pilot, once into the spotlight, 
could dramatically change the course and make the result of 
the calculating unit unusable for the control of anti-aircraft 
fi re. With increased fl ight speeds and aircraft altitudes, the 
direction of sound arrival and the direction to the airplane 
began to diff er so much that the “prozhzvuk” system became 
generally incapacitated. The need to create a fundamentally 
new means for the detection of aircraft became apparent.
The idea of testing the possibility of using radio 
methods to detect aircraft originated from military engineers. 
The advantages of radio were obvious: the high speed of 
propagation, the ability to work during the day and night, 
in the clouds, and behind the clouds, regardless of the 
weather. However, nobody had any idea how to approach 
this task, nor who could carry out the entire set of necessary 
research and development. Of course, in addition they had 
no idea how diffi  cult this task would be. One of the main 
initiators was Mikhail M. Lobanov (1901-1984), later 
a Lieutenant General (Figure 1), and another was Pavel 
K. Oshchepkov (1908-1992) (Figure 2), later Doctor of 
Technical Sciences (but a Gulag prisoner for 10 years, 
beginning in 1937). Both were then young, talented, and 
very active professionals. At the end of their lives, both of 
them published their memories [1, 2], which contained lots 
of interesting facts and details.
 
Being a fi eld synthesized of science and technology, 
radar has incorporated advances in the theory and technology 
of antennas, radiowave propagation, transmitters and 
receivers, signal processing, automatic control, information 
display, etc. It is impossible to pay appropriate attention to 
all these issues in a single paper. This paper summarizes 
the information known to the author from the literature, 
as well as from personal communication with some of 
direct participants in the hard and long process of radar 
development. In particular, the author was lucky to have a 
long period of communication with Profs. Yakov S. Itskhoki 
(1906-1984), Yakov D. Shirman (1919-2010), Yakov S. 
Shifrin, and Moisey I. Finkelshtein (1922-1992). He even 
met and in 1975 spoke to Yuriy B. Kobzarev (1905-1992). 
In the same year, 1975, the book by M. M. Lobanov [2], 
entitled Beginning of Soviet Radar, was published (in 
Russian). In spite of the obvious infl uence of “Soviet 
patriotism,” this book contains a lot of important facts 
and documents, a part of which is cited in this article. In 
addition, we have archival material and interviews with 
participants in the events that were collected and saved by 
their younger counterparts. 
Following the advice of Prof. Yakov Shifrin, who 
today is the oldest scientist in Ukraine who contributed to 
radar, in [3] we divided the process of radar development 
into fi ve stages: 1) The very fi rst works (1920-1941); 2) the 
period of WW II since the occupation of Ukraine (1941-
1945); 3) the postwar period (1945-1955); 4) the period of 
intensive radar development (1955-1990); 5) modern radar 
(1991 to present). In this article, the period of the fi rst two 
stages is mainly considered in detail, that is, since 1920 to 
the middle of the 1940s. A couple of later achievements 
(around 1955) are briefl y described.Figure 1. M. M. Lobanov (circa 1975).
Figure 2. P. K. Oshchepkov (circa 1935).
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Today, almost 80 years later, we have the possibility of 
compiling and generalizing the memoirs, papers, interviews, 
and recorded conversations to recreate an eye-opening 
picture of the research, development, and implementation 
of the fi rst radar facilities in the USSR, also taking into 
account that this picture was painted in the harshest years 
of the twentieth century.
2. First Experiments on Radio 
Detection of Airplanes
2.1. Radio Detection in UHF Band
Mikhail Lobanov, a military engineer, served in 
the Glavnoe Artilleriyskoe Upravlenie – GAU (Principal 
Department of Artillery – PDA) of the People’s 
Commissariat of Defense (PCD), actually the Ministry of 
Defense, since 1932 (see Table 1 for a list of abbreviations 
of the names of institutions that appear in this paper). He 
was one of the initiators and organizers of the fi rst research 
and development on radio detection for anti-aircraft artillery. 
In his memoirs [2], Lobanov told the following story. The 
idea to use radio waves for detecting airplanes (particularly 
bombers) was expressed in the PDA, but military engineers 
did not know who would be able to fulfi ll the necessary 
research. In 1933, during a private talk, Lobanov asked B. N. 
Mozhzhevelov, the Department Head of the Central Radio 
Laboratory (CRL), how he would have reacted to the idea 
of radio detection of aircraft. This question arose because 
the PDA intended to propose that the CRL conduct research 
in this direction. Mozhzhevelov recommended speaking 
fi rst to Yu. K. Korovin, and then perhaps to offi  cially apply 
to the Director of the CRL. At that time, Yuri K. Korovin 
(1907-1988) was the leader of the Decimeter Waves Group 
in the CLR, and was busy with two-way communications at 
decimeter wavelengths. His group had already developed 
transmitters, receivers, and measurement devices to conduct 
ARTA Artillery Radio-Technical Academy (in Kharkiv, Ukraine); later name: VIRTA: Voennaya Inzhener-naya RadioTechnicheskaya Akademiya (Military Engineering Radio-Technical Academy)
CRL Central Radio Laboratory
DC Department of Communications
GAU Glavnoe Artilleriyskoe Upravlenie (Principal Department of Artillery: PDA in English)
IRE Institute of Radio Physics and Electronics NASU (National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine)
KA Krasnaya Armiya (RA in English)
KhSU Kharkiv State University
LEMO Laboratory of ElectroMagnetic Oscillations 
LEPI Leningrad Electro Physics Institute
LETI Leningrad Electro-Technical Institute 
LIPT Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology
NII-9 Nauchno-Issledovatelskiy Institut No9 (Research and Development Institute #9: RDI-9)
NIIIS Nauchno-Issledovatelskiy Ispytatelniy Institut Svyazi (RDTIC in English)
PCD People’s Commissariat of Defense (the name of Ministry of Defense of the USSR in 30s)
PDA Principal Department of Artillery (GAU in Russian)
RA Red Army (KA in Russian)
RDI-9 Research and Development Institute #9 (NII-9 in Russian)
RDI Radio-
Industry Research and Development Institute of Radio-Industry
RDTIC Research, Development, and Testing Institute of Communications (NIIIS in Russian)
UIPT Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology
Table 1. A list of the abbreviated names of the institutions in this paper.
Figure 3. Yu. K. Korovin, a pioneer of ra-
dar in the USSR, developer of a CW radar.
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testing of communication range. D. N. Rumyantsev, the 
Director of the CRL, immediately agreed, and in October 
1933, a contract was signed [4]. It was a legal document – the 
fi rst in the USSR – that started research and development 
work as well as fi nancing in the fi eld of radar. Yuri Korovin 
(Figure 3) was assigned as leader of this work. Two-way 
radio equipment was allocated to carry out the experiments. 
This equipment was made earlier (except for the antenna) 
in the CRL, and used by Korovin in his investigations of 
the task of the Department of Communications (DC) of the 
Red Army (RA). The equipment contained:
 
•  A continuous-wave transmitter operating at a wavelength 
of 50 cm to 60 cm, but of very low radiating power: 
0.2 W;
•  A super-regenerative receiver; 
•  And two ground-based parabolic-refl ector antennas of 
2 m diameter (Figure 4). 
Oscillating tubes for this equipment were developed in 
1932-1933 by engineers of the Leningrad Electro-Technical 
Institute (LETI) V. I. Kalinin and Yuri A. Katsman (Figure 5), 
together with CRL researcher V. A. Tropillo (see Figure 4). 
A 1 2m  screen of sheet brass initially served as a refl ective 
surface to adjust the transmitter and receiver. A brash mesh 
of 10 2m  was later substituted for it.
The main experiment to verify the radiowave 
refl ections from fl ying aircraft was organized in Leningrad. 
Tests were carried out on the area of the rowing port. 
Radiating equipment was placed on the shore, and the 
receiving equipment was on sea ice at 20 m from the shore. 
The transmitting and receiving antennas were similar. 
According to the agreement with the PDA, experiments on 
the radio detection of the airplane were planned in December 
1933. However, due to adverse weather conditions with a 
lack of ice thickness off  the coast of the Gulf of Finland, 
the experiment was postponed. 
Finally, on January 3, 1934, the weather improved, and 
the long-awaited experiment of radio detection of aircraft 
was carried out. During the experiment, a seaplane made 
several takeoff s and landings with diff erent angles relative 
to the direction of radiation and reception. The reception 
apparatus allowed observing the Doppler eff ect in the form 
of a typical sound in the headphones when the seaplane 
entered into the zone of visibility.
Figure 4. The original antenna designed for the fi rst 
radar experiment. V. A. Tropillo is standing next to 
the antenna.
Figure 5. Yu. A. Katsman.
Figure 6. The report from CRL to PDA on the fi rst 
experiment on radio detection of aircraft (fi rst leaf). 
The start of the work was in August 1933, and the work 
ended January 1, 1934. The price was 6000 rubles.
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The seaplane was detected at a distance of 600 m 
to 700 m at 100 m to 150 m fl ight altitudes. Judging by 
these fi gures, it was quite a short distance, but in essence it 
established the key fact of detection of the refl ected signal 
from an aircraft. In 1935, Yu. K. Korovin got the “Author 
Certifi cate” (a kind of patent) number 2578, “Device for 
Radio-Detection of Aircraft Based on Using Doppler 
Phenomenon.”
During the next several days of January, Yu. Korovin 
held a number of fl ight tests, and collected reliable enough 
material for further work on the development of new 
equipment for detecting aircraft and direction fi nding. In the 
CRL report, sent to PDA by February 14, 1934 (Figure 6), 
Yu. Korovin formulated the fi rst results of his work:
1.  The direction fi nding of aircraft was possible at a 
distance of 8 km to 10 km in the case of a radiating 
power of the order of tens of watts and a wavelength 
of 10 cm to 20 cm. This conclusion was based on the 
results obtained with a power of 0.2 W at a wavelength 
of 50 cm.
2.  At 0.2 W power and a wavelength of 50 cm, the aircraft 
was detected at a distance of 600 m to 700 m.
3.  Direction fi nding of elementary surfaces (a 25 cm 
diameter disc) was obtained at the same power and the 
same wavelength at a distance of 100 m. The experiments 
with elementary surfaces allowed roughly calculating 
the refl ection eff ect from complex refl ectors (aircraft).
4.  Obtaining secondary characteristics of the fi eld, that is, 
the distribution of the refl ected fi eld in space depending 
on the position of an aircraft in the irradiated zone, was 
possible at a transmitter power of the order of 4 W to 
5 W at a distance of 1 km to 1.5 km. The apparatus 
used (0.2 W) did not allow the experimenters to carry 
out these measurements.
5.  Use of a multilayer screen made it possible to reduce 
the distance between the transmitting and receiving 
antennas to 1 m to 2 m; at a wavelength of 50 cm and 
a power of 0.2 W, the shortest distance between those 
antennas was 8 m.
Later, Yuri Kobzarev (1905-1992), a pioneer of pulse radar, 
wrote in his memoirs [5]:
 January 3, 1934 in Leningrad, the radio waves refl ected 
off  the aircraft were registered using a small purpose-
built device. From that day, which can be regarded as 
the birthday of the Soviet radar, the intensive research 
began. 
The conclusions of the PDA in 1934 were also very 
optimistic. They reviewed and approved the CRL report [6]. 
In addition, the need was identifi ed to boost development 
of radio-detection equipment, both in the CRL and in the 
Leningrad Electro Physics Institute (LEPI), to initiate a 
parallel development. The decision of the PDA provided 
for the desirability of speeding up the work to manufacture 
and test the operational prototype of the device during the 
same 1934.
2.2. Radio Detection in VHF Band
As was mentioned above, engineer Pavel Oshchepkov, 
who in 1932 served in the army, also proposed a similar 
idea for radio detecting aircraft. He intended to improve 
the air defense of the Red Army. The structure of the Air 
Defense Service included a series of observation posts, 
which were equipped with just binoculars and telephone 
communications to alert the Air Defense Command Points. 
In the Department of Air Defense, the idea of radio detection 
thus emerged based on the analysis of the organization of 
air-defense surveillance at observation posts. 
The diff erence between the approaches to radio 
detection in two Red Army departments (PDA and Air 
Defense) might not seem too obvious. However, it was. The 
purpose of the PDA was application of radio-engineering 
methods to detect aircraft for better aiming the antiaircraft 
artillery, while in the Air Defense, the purpose was to alert 
as early as possible regarding approaching bombers.
 
In the second half of 1933, in his report to the People’s 
Commissar of Defense, Pavel Oshchepkov outlined the 
principle of using the new means of radio detection of aircraft 
in the air-defense system. More detail was described in [7]. 
The request for assistance in the promotion of activities 
on radio detection of airplanes by Pavel Oshchepkov, as a 
representative of the Air Defense Department, was directed 
to academician Karpinsky, the President of the Academy 
of Science, who asked Abram F. Ioff e (1880-1960) for 
assistance. Ioff e did not work directly as a radar developer 
or designer, but his role was very signifi cant.
2.3 A Short Biography
of A. F. Ioff e
Abram Ioff e was born in 1880 in the town of Romny, 
situated in the province of Poltava (the central part of modern 
Ukraine). He was from a merchant family. He received 
higher education in the Romny specialized school from 
1889-1897. His schoolmate and close friend was Stepan 
(Stephen) Timoshenko, the father of modern engineering 
mechanics. Ioff e graduated from St. Petersburg Institute 
of Technology. He got a PhD from Munich University, 
where his teacher was Wilhelm Konrad Roentgen. Ioff e 
then rejected the fl attering off er to continue working with 
Roentgen, and returned to St. Petersburg. (At the end of 
his life, when Roentgen was seriously ill, Ioff e gave him 
money for X-rays and treatment). 
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Ioff e was a wonderful physicist in the Russian Empire 
and in the Soviet Union. In 1911, he determined the charge 
of the electron. His article was published only in 1913, 
a little bit later than was done by Robert Milliken, who 
is offi  cially recognized as the fi rst. Ioff e was extremely 
eff ective as an organizer of science, and was a creator of 
the powerful scientifi c school in the Soviet Union. In 1916, 
Ioff e organized his famous Seminar in Physics for young 
scientists in St. Petersburg. The participants in that seminar 
later became the pride of Soviet physics. He was a teacher 
of A. P. Alexandrov, P. L. Kapitsa, N. N. Semyonov, L. A. 
Artsimovich, I. K. Kikoin, Ya. I. Frenkel, I. V. Kurchatov, 
and many other prominent scientists. 
After the October revolution of 1917, Ioff e worked 
on the development of science under the new conditions. 
He was a very infl uential person, and the greatest authority 
in physics and engineering. He was also a smart and 
experienced “politician,” which gave him the possibility 
of avoiding expressing a political preference for a long 
time, and being useful for science and for scientists under 
the diffi  cult conditions of the Soviet reality. It was even 
strange that, according to [54], he became a Communist 
Party member only in 1942, in wartime, when he was 62. 
Abram Ioff e was offi  cially Vice President of the 
Academy of Science (never President), but he was known 
as the “Principal” Academician, father of Soviet Physics, 
or just “papa Ioff e.” In 1918, he organized the Physics 
and Mechanics faculty in the Polytechnic institute where 
engineer-physicists were prepared. In the same year, 
1918, he created and headed the Physics and Engineering 
Department at the State Roentgenological and Radiological 
Institute. In 1921, this department was transformed into 
the entire institute of applied physics, named the Institute 
of Physics and Technology (IPT), later the Leningrad IPT 
(LIPT) of the Academy of Sciences, and A. Ioff e became the 
Director of the LIPT. Today, this institute in St. Petersburg 
is named after Abram Ioff e. 
A huge number of research works done in LIPT were 
not signed by Ioff e, in spite of his signifi cant contributions: 
Ioff e was notable for his generosity in science, and did 
altruistically help his pupils. It was Ioff e who asked 
Rutherford, the head of Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge, 
to invite Piotr Kapitsa for work placement. In addition to 
LIPT, Ioff e headed the Agrophysics Institute since 1932. 
He was the initiator and very actively participated in the 
creation of the institutes for Physics and Technology in 
Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Sverdlovsk, and Tomsk. He 
could have been the leader of the Soviet atomic project, 
but he was brave enough to refuse this off er in favor of 
a younger scientist: Igor Kurchatov. Stalin said, “I don’t 
know such academician,” but Ioff e insisted, and Kurchatov 
was appointed and awarded with the title of Academician. 
In the beginning of the 1950s, when the anti-Semitic 
campaign on the “fi ght against cosmopolitism” was 
developed in the USSR, Ioff e was fi red by the institute 
created by him. Nevertheless, he did not capitulate: he 
organized a new Laboratory of Semiconductors. After 
Stalin’s death, he became the Director of the institute created 
on the basis of that laboratory. Ioff e was posthumously 
awarded the Lenin Prize (the highest award in the post-
Stalin USSR) in 1961.
However, let us go back to radar history. Abram Ioff e 
always quickly responded to any fresh idea [5]. Very soon, 
he thus invited his friend, Dmitry Rozhansky (1882-1936), 
as well as Alexander Chernyshov (1882-1940), Nikolay 
Papaleksi (1880-1947), Boris Shembel (1900-1987), 
Pavel Oshchepkov, et al., to the meeting organized by 
him on February 7, 1934. After the meeting and positive 
discussions, the Red Army Air Defense Department signed 
a contract on February 19, 1934, with LEPI [8] to study 
the refl ection of electromagnetic waves from diff erent 
surfaces, to develop radio-detection equipment, and to 
conduct the fi rst experiments to detect aircraft. Based on 
the accumulated material, it was then planned to develop 
a draft of an air-reconnaissance station. Engineer Boris 
Shembel was appointed as the immediate supervisor of 
the research. It is interesting to note that B. Shembel had 
already started to work on radio detection according to the 
contract with the PDA.
Before June 1, 1934, the equipment named “Rapid” 
was developed. This consisted of an electromagnetic 
wave oscillator (4.7 m wavelength,  200 W power), a 
superheterodyne receiver, and a receiving antenna designed 
as a horizontal dipole. In June, “Rapid” was tested near 
Leningrad. The radiating system was installed on the roof 
of LEPI and oriented into the direction of the receiver; it 
was stable during the tests. The receiver was moved within 
11 km to 50 km from the radiating system. An airplane, 
following its planned course, crossed the track of the 
electromagnetic radiation (the so-called “electromagnetic 
veil”) at diff erent points of the line-of-sight between 
the radiating and receiving equipment to determine the 
maximum distance at which the receiver still could reliably 
detect the airplane.
According to the test results of July 10-11, 1934, a 
record was compiled where it was indicated that the airplane 
was detected in all cases when it was within 3 km from 
the receiver at altitudes up to 1000 m. On August 9 and 
10, 1934, experiments with “Rapid” were repeated. The 
reception apparatus was installed in the Krasnogvardeisk 
area (50.4 km from the transmitter), and in the Siverska 
station (70.6 km from the transmitter); the airplane fl ew at 
altitudes up to 5200 m. In these experiments, the beat signal 
from the aircraft was heard with headphones at distances 
of 5 km to 7 km from the receiver.
In September 1934, the LEPI presented the second 
release of the “Rapid” equipment: a 100 W transmitter 
operating at a wavelength of 4.8 m, with the antenna system 
radiating at 60° in azimuth and elevation, and the receiver 
at the central station where a recording unit registered the 
received signals on a tape. 
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The “Rapid” device served as one of the prototypes 
for further development of radio-detection systems at NIIIS 
of the Red Army and in the radio-factory industry. At this 
point, the Red Army Air Defense Department stopped the 
work with LEPI, even though it had not yet been fully 
completed in accordance with the terms of the contract. 
The reasons were not fully clear, but very soon after, the 
LEPI was liquidated (more details are in the next section). 
3. Continuous-Wave or Pulsed 
Radar?
In a note dated January 4, 1934, Pavel Oschepkov 
wrote his principal considerations about the viability of a 
pulsed method of radio detection instead of the continuous-
wave method. His idea was based on the fact that in order 
to increase the detection range, the output power should 
be signifi cantly increased. In the continuous-wave method, 
the manufacturing of high-power oscillating tubes caused 
considerable diffi  culties, due to the prolonged heating of 
the electrodes. Powerful VHF tubes at that time required 
water cooling, and had a service life of only 50 hours. Use 
of these tubes was impractical, even in a half-load mode. 
Oshchepkov supposed that when using pulsed radiation 
instead of CW, the main diffi  culty in the production of high-
power VHF oscillating tubes – that is, the high temperatures 
on their electrodes – would disappear. According to his 
calculations, the power per pulse could be 100,000 times 
greater than the average power for continuous radiation, 
and this increased the range of detection. Today it is 
obvious that his conclusion was wrong: in reality, in order 
to detect a target at great distance, one needs signifi cant 
mean power in the sounding waveform for both the CW 
and pulse methods. 
In making his calculations, Pavel Oshchepkov 
arrived at the idea of creating a station with 360° visibility, 
determining two coordinates of the target: azimuth and 
range. However, this idea was not used in terms of research 
and development at that time. The systems with 360° 
visibility were developed and produced in radio factories 
ordered by the PDA a few years later. They were used for 
observation and alerting in the Air Defense Service, and 
as systems guiding fl ak artillery.
Although Oshchepkov expressed the idea of a 
preference for the pulse method, it thus did not result in 
the expression of a corresponding task of the LEPI. The 
development was carried out on the basis of the continuous-
wave method, and recording of the Doppler frequency.
Shortly after the meeting at Abram Ioff e’s offi  ce 
(February 7, 1934), Alexander Chernyshev applied to the 
Military Invention Division of PCD with the fi rst application 
(in the Soviet Union) for an invention in the fi eld of radio 
detection: “Device for the Detection of Airplanes and 
Airships in Flight by Means of Electromagnetic Waves.” 
Its essence was as follows: the radio-detection system 
would consist of a single continuous source of powerful 
electromagnetic radiation, and a large number of radio 
receivers located on the periphery around it. When a non-
directional radiation transmitter was used, the power should 
be signifi cant; in case of directed radiation, it could be 
much less. In the latter case, a directional antenna rotated 
and sequentially illuminated the horizon, or a part of it. 
Some experts, such as Prof. Boris Vvedensky (1893-1969), 
expressed serious comments on this approach, mainly 
because of problems caused by continuous radiation. It 
was noted that the use of pulsed radiation could save on 
average power and facilitate the fi ght against unwanted 
interference from the “direct” signal.
In accordance with the contract [8], the following 
performance characteristics were intended to be reached:
•  Detection of aircraft in the observed area and coordinate 
determination at altitudes up to 10 km and at a distance 
of 50 km;
•  Range accuracy of 2% to 5%;
•  Determination of the number of airplanes (one, two, 
unit, troop, squadron, and more);
•  Accuracy of determining the aircraft’s speed up to 
25 km/h.
Such LEPI obligations under the contract with the 
Air Defense Department demonstrated that neither LEPI 
nor the customer had yet imagined the complexity and 
scope of research and development necessary to provide 
such requirements.
As was mentioned above, although further 
experiments carried out in March 1935 with the improved 
equipment showed that the detection range could be 
signifi cantly increased, LEPI’s work in this direction was 
terminated by the customer. By this time, inside the Air 
Defense Department, the Experimental sector was created, 
with laboratories in Moscow and Leningrad. The orders 
for the development of a powerful VHF generator of 
continuous radiation and appropriate reception facilities 
were given to industry for the planned early warning system 
“Elektrovizor,” also proposed by Oshchepkov. 
In 1935, the LEPI was disbanded. Its premises, 
personnel, and equipment were handed over to the NII-9, or 
Research and Development Institute #9 (RDI-9). This was 
a new institute, which was organized for the development 
of important defense topics, including radar. Mikhail A. 
Bonch-Bruevich (1888-1940) was appointed as the scientifi c 
director of the new institute. He was known as the founder 
and leader of the former famous Nizhny Novgorod Radio 
Laboratory. Bonch-Bruevich knew very well the work 
of radio operators: “listeners” of the fi rst World War. He 
believed that the most promising method was the acoustic 
indication of the received signals. Indeed, the ability of 
wireless operators to extract the necessary signals from the 
incredible cacophony of sounds (a mixture of signals of 
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many stations, caused by bad selectivity of the receivers) was 
amazing. A strong preference for the continuous-radiation 
technique was therefore given in RDI-9. Actually, the work 
was aimed at creating radio-direction fi nders to replace 
the old acoustic system, which was combined with optical 
projectors (the so called “Projector-Sound”). Especially 
attractive (from their point of view) was a resemblance 
of these systems, so that operators would not even have 
to relearn [5].
 
There were many diffi  culties during the development 
of continuous-wave systems. They mostly occurred due to 
the proximity of the CW transmitter to the receiver, even if 
they were spaced apart by tens of meters. In 1934, in parallel 
with the work of the Boris Shembel team in LEPI, the 
pulse radio-detection method was also tested. The research 
on pulse radar was led by engineer Moisey D. Gurevich. 
Under his leadership, the experimental setup was based on 
a UHF magnetron oscillator working in pulsed mode. The 
oscilloscope, synchronized by the generator, was connected 
to the output of the receiver. The direct and refl ected pulses 
could be simultaneously marked on the screen. However, 
this work was also stopped [2]. The management had 
continued to give priority to the CW method, especially 
since there had been signifi cant advances in the creation 
of the transmitting and receiving UHF devices. Only after 
1938, at the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology 
(LIPT), when the experiments had been conducted that 
demonstrated the high performance of pulse technology, 
did the pulsed radar method get the rights of development 
also in RDI-9. However, the “Projector-Sound ideology” 
was not completely overcome: the pulse method was viewed 
only as a means of allowing replacement of the optical 
rangefi nder by a radio-rangefi nder (to allow the operation 
of the plant under cloudy conditions). Development of 
a decimeter direction fi nder with continuous radiation 
continued to play a leading role in the RDI-9 institute [5]. 
Anyhow, at that time, a radar system with continuous 
radiation that could be adopted for operational use was not 
created. All attempts to build a CW operational prototype 
failed [9]. 
At the same time, considerable success had been 
achieved in the application of the pulse method in the 
Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology (UIPT). 
There, in 1938, a pulsed-radar system was created for anti-
aircraft artillery (it was called the “Zenit”). This system 
operated in the 60 cm to 65 cm wavelength range [2, 10]. 
More details about this apparatus are in Section 5. 
4. First Radars for Anti-Aircraft 
Artillery
In 1935-36, the RDI-9 had to create a new mobile 
apparatus for radio detection for anti-aircraft artillery, and 
thoroughly test it on the range. Based on the experimental 
setup of 1935, and its testing using an airplane and 
a simulator, the pilot plant of the RDI-9 produced a 
transportable two-antenna fl ak radio searcher, “Burya.” 
The name radio searcher (radioiskatel) was used for this 
kind of radar. This development was still carried out in the 
laboratory headed by Boris Shembel. The radio searcher 
“Burya” included:
•  A magnetron oscillator at a  wavelength of 24 cm to 
25 cm, with a power of 6 W to 7 W continuous wave;
•  A regenerative receiver and detector with direct 
amplifi cation;
•  Two parabolic antennas (radiating and receiving) with 
diameters of 2 m and beamwidths of 7° to 10°;
•  A power supply (batteries and dry cells).
To facilitate the development of the radio searcher, 
the PDA gave to the RDI-9 a regular (acoustic) rangefi nder, 
ST-2. The horns and acoustic transmission lines were 
removed, and parabolic antennas were installed at the 
attachment points. All the radio equipment, together with 
batteries, were placed on the frame and the rotating base 
of the ST-2 sound ranger.
During the thorough testing, the “Burya” radio 
searcher (Figure 7) showed a target detection range 
(maximum) of 10 km to 11 km, with a median error in 
azimuth of 3° and in elevation of 4.1°. 
The performance of the radio searcher surpassed 
similar characteristics of the acoustic rangefi nder. However, 
the “Burya” radio searcher did not yet fully satisfy the 
requirements of the anti-aircraft artillery.
During the fi eld tests in Crimea, Boris Shembel fi rst 
noticed and then systematically observed the refl ection 
of electromagnetic waves from distant mountains (about 
100 km). This indicated that radio waves of 24 cm to 25 cm 
Figure 7. The radio-searcher “Burya.”
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could be used for aircraft detection at distances much 
greater than those obtained at the site. This fact was very 
important for future developments. During observations of 
refl ections from the mountains, the method of frequency 
modulation (FM) of the magnetron was used, which was 
introduced by Boris Shembel into the “Burya” equipment. 
Based on this experience, the idea of range measurement 
with FMCW radar was proposed by Shembel in 1937 [9]. 
The new radio searcher B-2 (Figure 8) had a parabolic 
antenna with a squinted antenna pattern and a beamwidth 
of 5° to 6°. To search for the aircraft, it used a conical scan 
within the sector of 40° to 50° in azimuth and elevation. 
By successively irradiating the airspace sector by sector, 
the radio searcher detected the airplane, and then switched 
to tracking by determining the angular coordinates by the 
equi-signal-zone method. 
For further development of radio searchers, Mikhail 
Bonch-Bruevich suggested using the idea of a fl at antenna 
beam, that is, a fan-shaped radiation pattern. He emphasized 
that fl at antenna patterns were able to simultaneously solve 
two main tasks: to increase the reliability of detection 
and searching for aircraft, and to improve the accuracy of 
determining the coordinates. Therefore, the next system that 
implemented this idea was the B-3 system. Two B-3 radio 
searchers formed a complex, in which one unit (azimuth) 
was designed to search for targets in the horizontal plane, 
and the other unit (elevation angle) searched in the vertical 
plane (Figure 9). Together, they determined the target’s 
coordinates in space-angle. Both radio searchers had 
antennas with fl at antenna patterns (fan-shaped), with a 
beamwidth of 35° to 40° in one plane, and 2° to 3° in the 
other plane. 
Both radio searchers were of identical structure and 
electronics, but they only diff ered in appearance by the fact 
that the antenna of the azimuth unit was horizontal, and the 
elevation-angle unit’s antenna was vertical. The coordinates 
of the target were determined by the maximum audibility 
of the refl ected signal. Later on, preference was given to 
a pulse radar for anti-aircraft artillery. 
5. Three-Dimensional Pulse Radar 
Development in UIPT
Ukraine was one of the most technically advanced 
republics in the USSR. It formally had legal attributes of 
independency, such as its own constitution and the formal 
right to secession – which, of course, was impossible to 
implement, in practice. Before the collapse of the USSR 
in 1991, Ukrainian scientists were involved in the overall 
development of science and technology of the USSR. 
Considering the contribution to radar, one should note 
that the most powerful community of radio-physicists in 
Ukraine was in Kharkiv. The history of radar in Ukraine 
(and in the USSR, as well) is inseparable from the history 
of the creation of the community of radio-physicists in 
Kharkiv in the twenties of the twentieth century. That is 
why we shall fi rst briefl y recall the essential milestones 
that are relevant to radar [11-13, 53].
5.1 Kharkiv Radiophysics School
By the beginning of the twentieth century, Kharkiv was 
a large industrial, cultural, and scientifi c center, with lasting 
university traditions. The Kharkiv State University (KhSU) 
was established by imperial decree in 1804. Remarkably, 
KhSU had four departments, including a Department of 
Physical and Mathematical Sciences. During the fi rst 
hundred years after its opening, the university trained 
a galaxy of prominent scientists, whose works brought 
them worldwide fame: mathematicians S. N. Bernshtein, 
M. V. Ostrogradsky, A. M. Lyapunov, and V. A. Steklov; 
biologist I. I. Mechnikov; chemist N. N. Beketov. physicists 
A. I. Akhiyezer, L. D. Landau, I. M. Lifshits, and K. D. 
Sinelnikov; chemist D. I. Mendeleev; and astronomers M. 
P. Barabashov and V. G. Fesenkov lectured at KhSU. The 
Figure 8. The radio-searcher B-2.
Figure 9. The radio-searcher B-3: the device for 
determining the elevation angle.
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university won a reputation as one of the most prestigious 
schools of higher education in the Russian Empire, and 
became a center of advanced science and technology. After 
the October revolution and bloody civil war, Kharkiv was 
chosen as the capital city of the Soviet Ukraine from 1919 
to 1934 (at that time, Kiev was considered less politically 
reliable). One of the fi rst research departments of physics 
in Ukraine was established in the KhSU in 1921. It was a 
new, independent scientifi c unit [12].
 
The department was established under the leadership 
of the prominent physicist, Dmitry Rozhansky [13]. 
Dmitry A. Rozhansky was born in Kiev, studied at the 
Kiev High School (the First Gymnasium), where famous 
writers Mikhail Bulgakov and Konstantin Paustovsky also 
studied, as well as the prominent aircraft designer, Igor 
Sikorsky. Rozhansky graduated (with an honors diploma) 
from the St. Petersburg University in 1904, and spent two 
semesters (1905/1906) in the laboratory of Prof. H. Simon 
in Gottingen, Germany, where he published his papers in 
the Physikalische Zeitschriff t journal. He fi nally defended 
his MS dissertation in 1908. Dmitry then worked in the 
Physics Department of the St. Petersburg Institute of 
Electrical Engineering under the leadership of Alexander 
S. Popov. Rozhansky moved back to Ukraine (to Kharkiv) 
in 1911, and in 1914, he became a Professor and Head 
of the Department of Physics at the KhSU. The Kharkiv 
period was very fruitful for Rozhansky’s creativity. In 1913-
1914, several of his fundamental results were achieved. 
In particular, in the book Electric Rays, he presented the 
physical foundations of radio engineering at the highest 
scientifi c level. At the same time, his famous book Electric 
Oscillations and Waves was published in two parts. As 
a recognized scientifi c leader, he had grouped around 
himself similarly minded associates, creating a supportive 
atmosphere and determining the topics of research. 
Rozhansky was one of the fi rst who foresaw the 
future of high-frequency radio engineering, and he initiated 
research on electromagnetic oscillations. In fact, this gave 
birth to the Kharkiv radio physics community as a whole. 
Research by D. A. Rozhansky (Figure 10) led to the 
creation of UHF magnetrons in Kharkiv [14] by his pupil, 
Abram A. Slutskin (Figure 11), together with Dmitry 
S. Shteinberg (1874-1934), who also was a follower of 
Rozhansky, despite his age (Figure 12). According to the 
reference of the great radio physicist, academician Leonid 
Mandelstam, these works were the most valuable in the fi eld 
of electronics of that time [15]. The use of magnetrons in 
radar led to a revolution in this fi eld.
In 1921, Rozhansky was invited to the famous Nizhny 
Novgorod Radio-Engineering Laboratory. However, in 
1923, he moved to Leningrad (then Petrograd, today St. 
Figure 10. D. Rozhansky (1882-1936). Figure 11. A. Slutskin (1891-1950).
Figure 12. D. Shteinberg (1874-1934).
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Petersburg) where, together with L. I. Mandelstam and N. 
D. Papaleksi, he took part in the organization and worked 
at CRL. 
After leaving Kharkiv, Rozhansky kept in close contact 
with his former staff  and students. He visited Kharkiv twice 
a year [15]. Around 1924, Abram Ioff e invited Rozhansky 
to the Leningrad State Physics-Technical Laboratory, 
organized by him, and to the Physics-Mechanical Faculty 
of the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute, where Rozhansky 
led the Department of Technical Electronics. 
Rozhanky was interested in issues of short-wave 
propagation, and in 1925 he again came to Kharkiv. There 
in Kharkiv, he met Yu. B. Kobzarev who, still being a 
student of Kharkiv University, assisted Rozhansky during 
measurements of receiving signals. Later, D. Rozhansky 
invited the talented student to Leningrad.
Rozhansky was an honest and deeply principled man, 
who never did anything that could be against his conscience, 
and he never was afraid to express his opinion. This was not 
easy in the environment of increasing suspicions, spying-
mania, and the approaching mass repression of the 1930s in 
the USSR. In the country, the fi ght against “enemies” was 
intensifi ed that time. In Leningrad, a group of “saboteurs” 
was charged with mass poisoning at one of the factories, and 
40 people were shot without court trials. In all institutions, 
meetings were organized where people usually voted 
unanimously, expressing the collective approval of the 
execution over “enemies.” At such a meeting, on September 
25, 1930, Rozhansky took the fl oor and said that he was 
an opponent of executions, especially without a court trial 
[16]. This action obviously served as a pretext to arrest 
Rozhansky on the night of October 4-5, 1930. Abram Ioff e 
immediately began to plead for his release. However, Ioff e 
only achieved that Rozhansky was released in nine months. 
Fortunately, after the prison stay, Rozhansky continued his 
scientifi c and pedagogical activity during several more 
years. However, his health was undermined, and he died 
in 1936, at the age of 48. 
Prof. Rozhansky always stimulated the interest of 
young scientists, and promoted many of them, who later 
became famous. It was no accident that two of his students, 
Abram Slutskin in Kharkiv and Yuri Kobzarev in Leningrad 
(who also graduated from Kharkiv University), headed the 
work on the development of the fi rst Soviet pulsed-radar 
systems.
Here, we have come to the principal hero of the 
story about the fi rst three-coordinate pulsed radar. There 
is no doubt that Abram Slutskin (1891-1950) was the most 
remarkable man in Ukrainian radiophysics and electronics 
between 1925 and 1950 [11]. He played a crucial role in 
developing modern radio science. A. Slutskin entered 
the Physics-Mathematics Department of KhSU in 1910, 
just before Rozhansky’s arrival. Rozhansky started a 
very interesting physical seminar, with active student 
participation. This determined Slutskin’s ever-lasting 
interest in electronics. Slutskin graduated from the university 
in 1916. He worked there as an assistant until 1928, and 
then as a professor in the Physics Department. In 1928, for 
three weeks he worked in the laboratory of Barkhausen 
in Gottingen, Germany. Thanks to his brilliant results in 
physics and microwave electronics, he was awarded the 
degree of DSc in 1937, without defending a thesis. He 
was elected a Corresponding Member (1939) and later 
Academician (1948) of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. 
His work was focused on the magnetron and on pulsed radar.
An important event in the development of the Kharkiv 
radiophysics community occurred in 1928, when a new 
research and development center named UIPT was founded. 
The key role in organizing this institute was played by A. 
Ioff e, who was then the Director of the LIPT. He persuaded 
the government that a certain decentralization of Soviet 
science was necessary, and suggested that Kharkiv was 
the best choice for a new institution. A. Slutskin and D. 
Shteinberg (1874-1934) were included among the UIPT 
staff , still keeping their university posts. A group of UIPT 
people is shown in Figure 13.
Figure 13. A group of UIPT 
people during the visit of P. 
Ehrenfest to Kharkiv in 1930.
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Systematically, the scientifi c level of UIPT became 
very high. Since 1932, Lev Landau (1908-1968), the future 
Nobel prize winner, was assigned Head of the Theoretical 
Department at UIPT. Landau was only 24, but he was 
already a world celebrity in theoretical physics. In addition, 
he lectured at Kharkiv Technical University (Polytechnic 
Institute) [17]. In the summer of 1934, the International 
Conference on Theoretical Physics was held in Kharkiv. 
Niels Bohr and other prominent theoreticians took part 
in that event. At that time, such famous scientists as Paul 
Dirac, Paul Ehrenfest, Vladimir Fock, George Gamow, 
Piotr Kapitsa, George Placzek, Rudolf Peierls, and Victor 
Weisskopf quite often visited UIPT, and some of them 
stayed there for a long time.
However, we can defi nitely assert that Landau had 
no relationship to the work in the fi eld of radar. He was 
greatly interested in theoretical physics, and did not work 
on engineering problems, especially related to military 
issues. In contrast, Slutskin was a physicist who was 
greatly interested in engineering. He foresaw major trends, 
especially in microwave electronics and related fi elds 
of physics. In the fi rst half of the 1920s, he investigated 
vacuum tubes in a magnetic fi eld, and got magnetron 
oscillations. In 1924, he had gotten L-band oscillations, and 
continued to work hard to conquest even higher frequencies. 
Actually, the development of three-dimensional pulse radar 
at L band (see the next subsection) in UIPT was mainly 
associated with his intuition and initiative, because there 
was no obvious reason for this choice of frequency band 
and exactly the pulse method. Research and development 
in the fi eld of higher-frequency bands later became the 
scientifi c credo of his followers. In particular, this was 
true relative to Alexander Usikov (1904-1995) (Figure 14), 
one of the founders (1955) and the fi rst Director of the 
IRE (the Institute of Radio Physics and Electronics) in 
Kharkiv, whose activities were focused on the development 
of millimeter and sub-millimeter bands. The laboratory 
of electromagnetic oscillations (LEMO) was created as a 
division of UIPT as early as in 1930, and, of course, it was 
led by A. Slutskin.
5.2 Creation of Eff ective 
Microwave Magnetrons in Kharkiv
Eff ective microwave oscillators – in particular, 
magnetrons – later became the key components of radar 
systems. UIPT was one of the fi rst institutions where the 
development of eff ective magnetrons was done. A. Slutskin 
began to work on this even much earlier. In 1924, after his 
success in getting L-band oscillations in generators of the 
magnetron type – that is, reaching the most high-frequency 
part of the spectrum then available – he began to work 
hard to achieve even higher frequency bands. Slutskin 
investigated the mechanisms and conditions of excitation 
of split magnetrons, and developed a theory of a magnetron 
oscillator operating in the dynatron mode. According to 
Usikov [33], Slutskin enjoyed an extremely high reputation 
as initiator of a completely new method of oscillation: the 
split-anode magnetron. Another active member of that 
team, Semion Braude (1911-2003),who was only 22-25 
(Figure 15) when working on magnetrons, noted [15]:
 Slutskin was my teacher, as he lectured on electrodynamics 
in KhSU where I studied. It was with his personal support 
that I was assigned to UIPT after my graduation. I have 
been formed as a scientist under a strong infl uence of 
him....It should be noted that he personally supervised 
all the research projects of his staff , and every day 
discussed the results obtained.
An interesting analysis of the fi rst publications on 
magnetrons was written in [18]. According to [18], the fi rst 
publication on magnetron oscillation was by A. W. Hull, 
whose papers [19, 20] appeared in 1921. Soon, A. Zachek 
Figure 14. A. Y. Usikov.
Figure 15. S. Y. Braude.
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demonstrated (in 1924) the possibility of generating high-
frequency oscillations by connecting an oscillation circuit 
between the magnetron’s cathode and its anode, and applying 
a permanent magnetic fi eld of a strength close to its critical 
value [21]. E. Habann revealed (in 1924) that by splitting 
the anode into two equal segments (a split anode), between 
which a high-frequency circuit was placed, the output power 
could be drastically increased [22]. In the same 1924 at 
KhSU, A. Slutskin and D. Shteinberg [18] investigated 
the processes occurring in electron tubes under the impact 
of an external fi eld. By using the three-electrode tube, 
they succeeded in generating electromagnetic oscillations 
within the wavelength band of 40 cm to 300 cm [23]. Later, 
they studied the eff ects associated with the tube-element 
geometry, operation modes, and the magnetic-fi eld strength 
[24]. At their request, industry manufactured diodes where 
the anode was made from a nonmagnetic material (tantalum) 
[11, 18]. By the end of 1925, these studies enabled A. 
Slutskin and D. Shteinberg to obtain oscillations with a 
wavelength of 7.3 cm. This was mentioned in the memorial 
paper about Slutskin [25], written by his former student Ivan 
Truten (1909-1990), whose picture is shown in Figure 16. 
Additionally, this result was stated in a book [26] with a 
reference to the archive materials [27]. Here, one should 
keep in mind that important pioneering experimental work 
was also published in 1928-1929 by H. Yagi [28] and K. 
Okabe [29], with a magnetron having a split anode in the 
form of two half-cylinders. It is obvious that all the works 
mentioned were really independently performed. From 
this analysis, one can conclude that there is no doubt that 
– together with the other researchers better known in the 
West – A. Slutskin and D. Shteinberg can be considered to 
be pioneers of the magnetron-oscillation method.
Later, many diff erent magnetron oscillators were 
developed in LEMO-UIPT. In Figure 17, a magnetron with a 
hollow anode, water-cooled from the inside, is shown. Two 
half anodes were connected by tunable circuits, consisting 
of metal tubes for bringing in the water and carrying it 
away. This design, proposed by Lelyakov, later served as 
the basis for diff erent modifi cations. Braude, Lelyakov, 
and Truten had developed a water-cooled magnetron in a 
glass case, which enabled them to achieve an output power 
of 5 kW to7 kW at a wavelength of 80 cm. Even higher 
power (up to 17 kW in the CW mode) with 55% effi  ciency 
Figure 16. I. Truten.
Figure  17. A magnetron with water cool-
ing in a glass case: 7P  kW, 80  cm.
Figure  18. A magnetron in a metal case 
(removed): 17P  kW in CW mode.
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was achieved by Braude, in the all-metal “barrel-type” 
oscillator (Figure 18). Moreover, a tunable magnetron 
was designed, in which the frequency was tuned over a 
30% band, by varying the length of the circuit extending 
off  the metal case. These results were only published after 
the war, in 1946 [30].
At the same time, extensive investigations of the 
magnetron’s power and frequency control, and the design 
of a pulsed mode device, were carried out. This work was 
led by Usikov. In 1933, Usikov discovered the eff ect of 
discontinuous modulation, which could be observed in a 
magnetron provided that its connection circuit corresponded 
to the relaxation scheme. Later he, together with colleagues 
[31], investigated the characteristic features of pulsed 
excitation in magnetrons. This work resulted in the design 
of high-power pulsed L-band magnetrons. At this time, 
a packaged un-cooled magnetron, with a linear cathode 
inserted in a glass case, was developed (Figure 19). It 
was implemented by Alexander Usikov, Ivan Truten, 
Iosif Vigdorchik (1910-1980), and Semion Braude. At 
the end of 1938, it generated pulsed power of 12 kW to 
60 kW at a wavelength of 60 cm to 65 cm. Based on its 
own theoretical work, the UPTI thus created a series of 
magnetrons operating at wavelengths from 20 cm to 80 cm, 
with average power generation of 10 W to 100 W. More 
details can be found in [18].
It is worth recollecting that even earlier, the results 
on magnetron generators obtained by A. Slutskin were 
used in the CRL by Yu. Korovin’s group when creating 
facilities for the radio detection of aircraft in 1934. Since 
September 1934, UPTI started to supply magnetrons of 
diff erent powers and diff erent wavelengths to the design 
bureau of the Red Army Air Defense.
By the end of 1936 [18], LEMO-UIPT had thus carried 
out a wide range of fundamental research on the magnetron 
method, and had a complete set of L-band devices, both for 
CW and for pulsed operation. This was a solid background 
for launching complex work on developing pulsed radar.
5.3 Development of the Pulsed 
Radar “Zenit” at UIPT
According to [2], from 1937, by decree of the PCD, 
the work on radio detection of aircraft for the air-defense 
alert service were to be the duty of the DC-RA via its 
body the Research, Development, and Testing Institute 
of Communications (RDTIC-RA): N I I I S ,  in Russian. 
Along with the problems associated with long-range 
surveillance for air defense, the RDTIC-RA initiated a 
parallel development of improved radars for anti-aircraft 
artillery. Having studied the state-of-the-art of the preceding 
developments, the experts of the RDTIC-RA concluded 
that they should employ the pulsed method.
The UIPT, foreseeing and following the general 
trend of the developments in the fi eld of microwave radio 
engineering, began – earlier than other institutions – its 
own theoretical and experimental research in the fi eld of 
generating electromagnetic waves using magnetron methods 
in L band, S band, and in the even shorter centimeter bands. 
Subsequently, these studies were a signifi cant contribution 
to the development of radio-detection equipment, not 
only for their own needs, but also for their Leningrad and 
Moscow colleagues.
Further studies in this area were carried out in the 
LEMO at UIPT, and Abram Slutskin was the Head of the 
Laboratory from 1930. Based on the successful development 
of the generators, by the end of 1936 Slutskin launched an 
ambitious project on the development of the fi rst pulse radar. 
This was able to determine all three coordinates of a target, 
while all modern (at that time) experimental systems were 
designed to determine only two coordinates of a target. 
Beginning in March 1937, in accordance with the task that 
was formulated by the RDTIC-RA, the UIPT offi  cially 
started the design of an L-band pulse radar for anti-aircraft 
artillery [32]. It was tentatively named “searchlight,” and 
had to operate at a wavelength of 60 cm to 65 cm. 
In July 1937, the draft of the short-range radar for air 
targets (that was the name of the system for anti-aircraft 
artillery) was ready. It was equipped with a purposely 
developed magnetron of 1 kW power at a 68 cm wavelength 
[2]. 
This work, coded “Zenit,” was performed under the 
guidance of A. Slutskin by the staff  of LEMO: S. Braude, 
Figure  19. A pulse magnetron, 60P  kW.
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A. Chubakov, Y. Kopilovich, P. Lelyakov, A. Maidanov, 
I. Sorkin, I. Truten, A. Usikov, and I. Vigdorchik, who 
contributed at various stages and to various extents. 
In the middle of 1938, the fi rst test of the “Zenit” 
prototype was fulfi lled by detecting a small airplane. Some 
details of this radar prototype’s development were found 
in Usikov’s archive, which has partially survived [34]. 
In addition, a lot of interesting facts were revealed from 
interviews with S. Braude, A. Usikov, and other participants 
in the events or their younger colleagues [11, 15, 33]. It 
is interesting to follow the features of the systems and its 
principal components.
5.3.1 Features of Radar Design
A. Usikov described this radar as a two-antenna 
laboratory setup, in which the refl ector antennas of the 
transmitter and receiver were separated approximately 
50 m from each other, in order to reduce jamming of the 
sensitive receiver due to the high-power pulses of the 
transmitter. Both refl ectors scanned in a synchronous 
manner in the horizontal (0°-360°) and vertical (0°-90°) 
planes, thus providing a stable, parallel orientation of the 
antenna-pattern axes [33].
A transmitter was located on the back side of the 
radiating refl ector, in a hermetically sealed metal case. A 
two-wire feed, inductively connected with the magnetron 
circuit, was loaded with a half-wave dipole placed in 
the focus of the paraboloid of revolution. The receiver’s 
refl ector was of similar design, with the circuitry located 
in a hermetically sealed case at the back. Synchronized 
rotation of the refl ectors was achieved by using selsyns.
5.3.2 Antennas
The antennas used identical all-metal parabolic 
refl ectors, 3 m in diameter, fed by in-focus half-wave dipoles 
(Figure 20). A. Usikov recalled that manufacturing of the 
parabolic refl ectors required a lot of sheet metal with a 
good environmental resistance. He hence he came up with 
the idea that it could be made of galvanized iron. This led 
him to a necessary but also risky action. Somebody in his 
team noticed that the institute buildings were equipped with 
rather impressive rainwater pipes, about 30 cm × 30 cm 
in cross section, made of what was needed. One night, all 
these pipes were taken off , fl attened, and used to make 
refl ector segments. Usikov was fi ned as the initiator of this 
action [33]. Refl ector-antenna theory did not exist in the 
1930s. Nevertheless, we can see that the “optimal” way to 
build the refl ectors was found, although the performance 
characteristics of such antennas probably were far from 
optimal. The beamwidth of the amplitude radiation pattern 
of the antenna was about 16° in the “equatorial plane.”
5.3.3 Transmitter
The development of the transmitter was led by 
A. Usikov, with I. Vigdorchik and P. Lelyakov participating. 
The transmitter was actually a magnetron source with 
a stabilizing resonant circuit. It was important to fi nd a 
proper way for pulsed excitation of magnetrons. This led to 
comprehensive testing of several magnetrons, with diff erent 
cathodes and anodes. Assembly, adjustment, and the fi rst 
tests of the Zenit setup were carried out by using an un-
cooled packaged magnetron. A modulator was connected 
in series with the magnetron. It used standard GK-3000 
tubes. A relaxation-generator circuit, exploiting the TG-212 
thyratron, was selected as a control device. 
Figure 20a. The Zenit antenna. Figure 20c. Another view of the 
Zenit antenna.
Figure 20b. The transmitter located 
on the back side of the radiating 
refl ector of the Zenit antenna.
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The fi rst variant of the radar transmitter, in 1938, had 
the following parameters: wavelength, 60 cm; pulse power, 
3 kW; pulse duration, 7 μs to 10 μs; magnetron voltage, 
18.3 kV; pulse current, 20 A; magnetron lifetime, 50 hours. 
In 1940, the modernized Zenit radar used a new magnetron, 
with a pulse power of 10 kW to 12 kW, a wavelength of 
64 cm, and a pulse duration of 10 μs  to 20 μs.
5.3.4 Receiver
S. Braude, Y. Kopilovich, A. Maidanov, and I. Truten 
were responsible for the development of the receiver. First, 
they designed an original magnetron receiver, where a 
double-anode magnetron was used as a super-regenerative 
detector. This receiver enabled them to carry out the tests 
of detecting an airplane using the fi rst version of the Zenit 
radar (1938). However, this could not serve as the basis 
for developing a radar able to meet the requirements of 
the anti-aircraft artillery, due to the strong dependence 
of the receiver’s sensitivity on the magnetic fi eld and the 
magnetron’s emission current. That is why, along with 
this device, the research team had investigated a super-
regenerative receiver based on the 955 type of acorn 
tube (a triode). This had a much higher sensitivity, and 
was implemented in the modernized version of the Zenit 
radar. Later on, to enhance the sensitivity of the receiver, 
I. Truten developed a superheterodyne receiver with an 
L-band amplifi er (1940).
5.3.5 Calibration and Testing
In the summer of 1938, an experimental electromagnetic 
Zenit “searchlight” was assembled. Preliminary calibrations 
of the receiver and transmitter were done by Truten and 
Kopilovich at the 8 km line-of-sight test range between the 
UIPT hillside compound and the Kharkiv Tractor Industry 
[33]. The fi rst tests of aircraft detection were carried 
out on October 14, 1938. The receiver and transmitter 
antennas were placed at a distance of 65 m from each 
other, and the optical axes of their refl ectors were fi xed 
to be parallel at elevation angles of 20°. An SB-type 
middle-sized bomber fl ew at a distance of 3 km from the 
radar, crossing the radiation pattern of the antenna system. 
Under such conditions, a stable eff ect of refl ection of the 
decimeter waves from the aircraft was observed. On this 
basis, the conclusion was made regarding reliable detection 
of the aircraft at a distance of 3 km. This result was quite 
appropriate for the beginning of the work [2]. It was of the 
same order as the fi rst research results, obtained at CLR 
and LEPI (Section 2), but it was obtained using the pulse 
method instead than the continuous-wave method.
The test results enabled the designers to understand 
what should be done to improve the performance of Zenit. 
Satisfi ed with the fi rst results, the CD-RA allocated a new 
project to LEMO-UIPT in May 1939. The task was to 
increase the radiation power and to improve the reliability. 
The modernized prototype radar had the following 
performance specifi cations: a wavelength of 64 cm; a pulse 
power of 10 kW to 12 kW; and a pulse duration of 10 μs 
to 20 μs [2]. It was under preparation to be transferred to 
industry. 
In less than four months, WWII started in Western 
Europe. In about three weeks, it was accompanied by the 
Soviet campaigns against Poland, the Baltic States, and 
Finland. This added the zeal of military-oriented research 
and development work. 
In September 1940, a modifi ed Zenit radar was 
presented to interested customers for tests. The Department 
of Air Defense, the Red Navy, the PDA-PCD, the RDTIC-
RA, and others were among them. Investigation of detection 
possibility and coordinate determination was done on a 
single airplane and on a group of airplanes. S. Braude 
was an eyewitness of this test. In his interview [11, 15], 
he recalled: 
The mission of a bomber was to execute several turns 
on the fl ight course. First it fl ew away from the radar for 
50 km, then turned right, fl ew 50 km more, then turned 
back, fl ew 100 km, and so on, repeating this route six times. 
During the fi fth circle, the pilot turned to the opposite 
side, as he did not seriously consider the experiments 
and hoped that this deviation, in the clouds, would not 
be detected. He was deeply impressed that his unplanned 
maneuver was recorded at the ground-based station. From 
that moment, he became an active zealot of radar and played 
an important role in the fate of the Zenit project.
The fi nal report on the test results (1940) [34] 
confi rmed the following. The device was able to determine 
the three-dimensional position of a single aircraft at various 
heights. The range of the reliable detection and three-
dimensional target-position determination at altitudes of 
4000 m to 7000 m was 6 km to 25 km. At ranges of 25 km to 
35 km, the detection was less reliable. Two tests were done 
to estimate a relative measurement accuracy. Comparisons 
of the airplane altitudes determined by the Zenit radar with 
the barograph indications revealed an average diff erence 
8.9% in the fi rst test, and 5.2% in the second test.
The times required to determine the target coordinates 
were as follows: 
a.  two coordinates, elevation and range: 13 sec; 
b.  two coordinates, azimuth and range: 17 sec; 
c.  three coordinates, elevation, azimuth, and range: 38 sec.
Interesting conclusions were drawn from the 
observations of squadrons with the Zenit radar. A group 
of airplanes was reliably detected at heights of 3000 m 
and 4000 m in the specifi ed space sector. If a squadron 
was fl ying in tight order, the oscilloscope indicated the 
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beating of pulses refl ected from each aircraft. If one of 
the airplanes was behind the others, one could observe the 
variation of the width of the maximum corresponding to the 
refl ected signals. If a squadron was fl ying in a column, with 
the airplanes separated by 2 km, the oscilloscope screen 
clearly indicated the pulses refl ected from each individual 
aircraft, in the form of isolated maxima. Even some results 
concerning target resolution were obtained [34].
The generalized basic results of those tests according 
to [2] showed the maximum range of reliable detection of 
a single SB-type airplane was 25 km, and of a group of 
planes was 30 km. The measurement accuracy was 1 km 
on range, 3° to 4° degrees in azimuth, 1° to 2° degrees in 
elevation angle, and 10% in height.
Estimating the overall results of the Zenit tests, the 
state commission offi  cially asserted [2] that the Ukrainian 
Institute of Physics and Technology (UIPT) had designed 
the fi rst experimental setup that enabled locating a fl ying 
airplane in three coordinates (distance, azimuth, and 
elevation). Later, General Lobanov [2] wrote that it was a 
great success for the young UIPT team. Compared with the 
experimental radio searchers “Burya” and B-2, developed 
at RDI-9, the Zenit prototype had considerable advantages 
for the detection range, and the ability to determine all three 
coordinates that are necessary for shooting air-defense 
artillery, which was a very important quality in that time. 
Neither the British Chain Home nor the German Freya 
(which were perhaps the most advanced radar systems in 
Western Europe) could estimate both target azimuth and 
elevation angle along with target range. 
However, due to some shortcomings of the Zenit 
prototype, the UIPT was forced to continue the work on 
its improvement. The fi rst drawback was the inability to 
continuously determine the coordinates of the airplane and 
to enter them into the antiaircraft director in preparing data 
for anti-aircraft fi ring. Zenit could periodically determine 
target coordinates: as mentioned above, for the evaluation 
of all three coordinates, 38 seconds were required.
The second drawback was the diffi  culty in target 
search due to the narrow antenna pattern, similarly to radio 
searchers Burya and B-2, developed by RDI-9.
The third drawback was the presence of a dead zone 
of radius 6 km, within which anti-aircraft artillery could 
not fi re. Meanwhile, this area was the most eff ective in 
shooting with guns of 85 mm caliber.
Finally, it was stated that the three-coordinate Zenit 
prototype couldn’t yet serve as a basis for the industrial 
production. The Committee recommended that UIPT 
fi nalize the design of the station to improve the reliability 
of aircraft detection and accuracy of height determination, 
and provide continuous determination of the coordinates.
Having limited funds and production capacity, the 
Ukrainian Institute met with considerable diffi  culty in 
manufacturing this device [2]. Under such conditions, 
the fact that a group of able young scientists at UIPT not 
only succeeded to make the theoretical calculations and 
experiments necessary for developing a laboratory version 
of the Zenit pulse radar, but had managed to produce the 
radar setup on its own, was credited to the eff orts and 
enthusiasm of the team.
In [11], a comment was made that helped better 
understand the situation at UIPT in that time. Along with 
the technical problems mentioned, the working conditions at 
LEMO were certainly inadequate in 1935-1938, because of 
the general atmosphere at UIPT during the years of Stalin’s 
terror. At that time, the UIPT, a leading research center, 
was literally smashed by a series of severe repressions, 
with Lev Landau being the main target [26].
United by a common goal, Slutskin’s people kept 
perfectly friendly relations, despite sharp discussions 
[15]. However, the climate in the institute was not 
favorable for healthy working conditions. Some of the 
UIPT scientists were arrested; others were interrogated; 
frequent political meetings of the communist party, trade 
union, and Komsomol brought fear and embarrassment to 
the collective. 
In addition, some of the leading scientists – fi rst 
of all, the theoreticians – displayed neglect towards the 
radiophysics research, considering it second-rate physics. 
The gap became even deeper when UIPT started working 
on defense projects, which dominated in research and 
development carried out by LEMO. The Ukrainian 
historians of science Y. Pavlenko, Y. Ranyuk, and Y. 
Khramov wrote [26] that exactly the latter point was at 
the very core of the confl ict at UIPT.
When the defense-oriented research was started at 
UIPT, most scientifi c leaders of the institute who normally 
determined the science policy were not involved into 
the new defense themes. The reason was not fully clear. 
Somebody could refuse to participate in the military projects, 
feeling that this would inevitably limit the freedom of 
research. It could also have been possible that they were 
not allowed to do so by the then-director of the institute 
or by the NKVD/KGB. Meantime, military projects had 
preference; moreover, the scientists involved were paid 
greater salaries. This resulted in splitting the institute into 
two confl icting groups, each of which had its sympathizers 
beyond the institute. In accordance with [35], part of the 
UIPT scientists, including Landau, proposed to separate 
LEMO from the UIPT. In fact, further developments proved 
that this could have been the best solution. The matter was 
that in the atmosphere of a search for enemies in the 1930s, 
this internal confl ict was actively exploited by the NKVD. 
Fortunately for LEMO, work on the radar project played 
the role of a protective shield, thus allowing them to study 
the fundamental microwave problems, as well. 
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It can be added that this was always a common practice: 
in the early 1950s, the leaders of Soviet physics successfully 
used nuclear programs to save the theory of relativity 
and quantum mechanics from the Stalinist ideological 
mobsters, while the less-fortunate fi elds of genetics and 
cybernetics (computer science) were crushed [36]. In this 
connection, from the view of the story on Ukrainian radar 
development, the most important point is that Lev Landau, 
the indisputable informal scientifi c leader of UIPT, who 
was really a very bright personality, did not stay away from 
this internal confl ict. All who left their opinion in any form 
[35], including the NKVD informers whose observations 
were summarized in the voluminous fi le on Landau in the 
KGB [37], agreed that Landau’s attitude toward the radar 
project at LEMO (and so personally toward A. Slutskin) 
was negative. Although this was his general attitude toward 
the military research in the USSR throughout all of his 
life, he later never openly expressed it [37], and he had 
reasons for this. It was only his worldwide fame that saved 
him in 1937, when the NKVD pointed to him as a leader 
of the “Trotskyist-sabotage group” accused of “trying to 
spoil defense works in UIPT” [26]. Landau then escaped 
to Moscow, to work in the Institute of Physical Problems 
of Piotr Kapitsa. Nevertheless, he was arrested in 1938, 
and spent one year in the NKVD jail before being saved, 
both for science and life, due to the extraordinary eff orts of 
Kapitsa (who personally appealed to Stalin). Later, along 
with many other Soviet scientists, he used military nuclear-
program research as a shield against the persecutions [36].
Working on overcoming the indicated drawbacks, 
UIPT also tried to increase the energetic potential of the 
Zenit setup to increase the detection range. In 1939-1940, 
the situation inside UIPT became somewhat more favorable 
for LEMO. The work schedule of the laboratory for 1941 
foresaw solving the problems around the improvement 
of Zenit, and the development of a single-refl ector pulse 
radar, Rubin.
However, the beginning of the war on the territory of 
the USSR infringed on these plans. It is well known that 
Moscow experienced its fi rst air raid on the night of July 
22, 1941. Under these circumstances, the DC-RA off ered 
to check the feasibility of using the Zenit system in combat 
situations for the air defense of Moscow [2]. Even before, 
at the very beginning of the war, the pilot who took part in 
the 1938 tests of Zenit in Kharkiv wrote a letter to Stalin, 
and urged him to deploy this promising detection system 
[11]. On August 16, the LEMO staff  members S. Braude, 
A. Chuhakov, L. Kitaevsky, Y. Kopilovich, A. Maidanov, A. 
Slutskin, A. Terpilo, I. Truten, A. Usikov, and I. Vigdorchik 
were sent to Moscow, and added to the RDTIC-RA. They 
brought the experimental Zenit radar, which was installed in 
the town of Mytishchi, into combat service. The radar was 
connected directly with the command post for air defense in 
Moscow. The certifi cates given to A. Slutskin in his mission 
to Moscow for testing the radar are shown in Figure 21. 
They played the role of identifi cation, guaranteeing a safe 
passage to Moscow [11].
Braude [15] told about an occurrence that happened 
during their work in Mytishchi. A group of soldiers were 
assigned to the radar team. The moral atmosphere at the 
beginning was full of tension. Of course, people did not 
have any understanding of the radio-detection principle, 
and groups of healthy men staying in the rear could be 
considered to be escaping from military service. The 
situation changed when the team succeeded in detecting 
by radar that, during a raid on Moscow, one of the German 
bombers left the fl ight order and made a loop to the east. 
Thanks to a report to the air-defense command post, this 
bomber was shot down by the anti aircraft artillery.
In September 1941, after further testing, the 
commission, chaired by the deputy commander of the air 
defense corps, Colonel Makeev, noted [2]:
•  The station could not detect near-fl ying aircraft within 
a range up to 15 km, because of refl ections from local 
objects;
•  The detection range was 60 km at fl ight heights above 
5000 m;
Figure 21. The certifi cates given to A. A. Slutskin in 1941 for the journey to Moscow and participation 
in the tests of “Zenit” in combat conditions.
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•  The mean location error was 2.5° in azimuth, and not 
more than 1.5 km in height.
The tests demonstrated that after improving the radar, 
the detection range increased by a factor of two, but the dead 
zone also increased by more than twice. The commission 
noted that the present Zenit radar could not be employed 
for precise aiming and tracking of anti-aircraft artillery, but 
its accuracy was suffi  cient for barrage fi re. Besides, this 
station could be used for the guidance of fi ghter aircraft, as 
supplementary equipment to the RUS-2 surveillance radar 
(see Section 7). Further modifi cations could be developed 
only under laboratory conditions. However, such work was 
not possible at that time, neither in Moscow nor in Kharkiv. 
Because of the evacuation of the RDTIC-RA to Bukhara, 
on October 17, 1941, the Zenit radar and the whole LEMO 
team were dispatched there.
In the meantime, UIPT itself was already on its 
way to central Asia. As is known, in the summer of 1941, 
the situation on the Soviet-German front dramatically 
developed. In the fi rst days, the cities of Riga and Minsk 
were lost, and rather soon, the German tank armies were 
threatening Moscow. The more-successful defense of Soviet 
troops in the Kiev direction put a serious strategic problem to 
the German commanders. On August 23, 1941, at a meeting 
in the headquarters of the “Center” group of armies, Hitler 
rejected a proposal by General Guderian to concentrate 
all the forces for an off ensive on Moscow, and decided 
to attack East Ukraine from the north. Kharkiv, which is 
located to the east behind Kiev, was in the mainstream of 
the new German off ensive. After the fall of Kiev, at the 
end of September, the fate of Kharkiv was determined, 
and on October 24, the Red Army left it. However, much 
earlier, in July 1941, the State Defense Committee had 
decided to evacuate the heavy industries of Kharkiv to 
the east. Obviously, the UIPT was not an industry, but it 
was still considered a valuable organization, and had to be 
evacuated, as well.
6. Development of the Single-
Antenna Radar “Rubin”
In 1939-1940, along with designing the Zenit radar, 
LEMO UIPT performed three research and development 
projects for the CD-RA: “Generator and Receiver Operating 
in cm-Band,” “Application of the Independent Excitation 
Principle for Generating Frequency-Stable dm-Band 
Pulses,” and “Design of a High-Power Pulse Source at dm-
Band Stabilized by a Resonant Circuit” [2]. The results of 
these studies, as well as the experience accumulated during 
development and testing the Zenit radar, enabled LEMO 
to proceed with the design of the “Rubin” radar in 1941. 
This system had to have increased target-detection range 
and improved accuracy of target location. Nevertheless, 
perhaps the most interesting aspect was the development 
of the single-antenna system for both transmitting and 
receiving. Unfortunately, the rapid approach of the front line 
forced LEMO of UIPT to stop working as early as in July 
1941, and to pack the equipment for a long trip. The fi nal 
destination for the UIPT was Almaty, Kazakhstan; except 
for LEMO, which was evacuated to the city of Bukhara, 
Uzbekistan, over 3500 km away from Kharkiv, and 1500 km 
from Almaty. Located in the heart of Central Asia, Bukhara 
city had a glorious past. Before 1920, it was the capital of 
the Emirate of Bukhara, a multi-national Muslim country 
that was under the protectorate of the Russian Empire.
In fact, the separation of the radiophysics laboratories 
of UIPT that was proposed by “pure physicists” in 1937 was 
thus done by the war: the LEMO was separated from the 
Figure 22. The group from UIPT and RDTIC-RA in Bukhara, February 23, 1942.
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other departments of UIPT. After WW II, UIPT returned to 
Kharkiv, and all its laboratories were again working together. 
Here, history took a curious twist [11]: in the 1940s and 
1950s, the Institute was a major research and development 
organization behind the NKVD-managed nuclear project 
code-named “Lab No 1.” At that time, all the departments 
of the UIPT enjoyed the benefi ts of working on extremely 
important defense topics, except for two radiophysics 
departments (the former LEMO, headed by Slutskin, and 
the new Department of Radio-Wave Propagation, headed by 
Braude). Obviously, to avoid new confl icts and also due to 
a rising interest in developing mm wave plasma-diagnostics 
technologies for Tokamak fusion machines, it was decided 
to separate these departments from UIPT, and to establish a 
new institute, the IRE. It is worth noting that Slutskin was 
against this separation, which was approved only after his 
sudden death in 1950.
However, let us go back to Bukhara of 1942. The work 
on the Rubin project was resumed there, in collaboration 
with the RDTIC-RA, which was also evacuated to Bukhara 
(Figure 22). The scientists of RDTIC-RA, M. Kulikov, K. 
Motorin, and N. Nechayev, actively participated in this 
work. By that time, LEMO had lost some of its leading staff  
members, including Lelyakov, who remained in Kharkiv. 
In place of Lelyakov, L. Kitayevsky joined the project as 
a radio engineer.
In order to eliminate drawbacks found during the 
tests of the Zenit device, the causes of the errors due to the 
direction-fi nding technique selected (a null-reading method) 
were analyzed, and several methods of continuous detection 
were considered. As a result, a continuous-location scheme, 
utilizing the stationary-dipole method, was selected. Its 
implementation and accuracy were tested, and the key blocks 
were fi nalized. However, the lack of necessary industrial 
capacity (radar was then produced in Tashkent) resulted 
in a failure to apply the new scheme for target location.
The receiver and transmitter circuits of the Rubin radar 
were similar to those of the Zenit. However, to increase the 
power and stability of the source, and to raise the sensitivity 
of the receiver, some corrections and changes were 
introduced in the design. The pulsed power of the magnetron 
was increased up to 15 kW. The improved receiver was 
essentially a wideband superheterodyne, with double 
frequency conversion. It had a high-frequency part (an 
L-band amplifi er, the fi rst mixer, and the fi rst heterodyne), 
and an intermediate-frequency amplifi er, all placed in a 
hermetically sealed case on the back of the antenna refl ector. 
The power-supply unit, the remote-adjustment blocks, 
and the amplifi er control console were located in a truck. 
The heterodyne wave meter, for controlling the source 
frequency, was also placed there. While developing the 
Rubin radar, Truten had succeeded in solving the extremely 
“hot” problem of providing the operation of a radar with 
a single antenna and also protecting the receiver from the 
impact of a high-power source pulse. This was done by 
employing a gas discharger, which blocked the input of the 
receiver circuit when a high-powered pulse arrived. As an 
additional measure, blocking of the intermediate-frequency 
amplifi er’s fi rst cascade was provided. 
S. Braude recalled [15] that I. Truten was an innovator 
with extraordinary capabilities. A fundamental approach 
was always present in his research, and was especially 
brightly displayed later, when he guided the work of 
developing the mm-band magnetrons in the 1950s and 
1960s at IRE, enjoying huge respect among the staff . 
The antenna of the Rubin was designed as a paraboloid 
of revolution, 3 m diameter, with transmitter and receiver 
dipoles located in the focus (Figure 23). The dish was 
deployable, and consisted of six removable segments, made 
from 2-mm diameter wire. As recalled by Usikov [33], the 
wind loading was really strong for such large-size refl ectors. 
Hence, it was clearly necessary to resort to a mesh-antenna 
design. These were made from wires stretched on the ribs, 
and soldered with a spacing of 20 mm × 20 mm. All this 
was handmade by the team members. 
The beamwidth of the antenna pattern’s main lobe (at 
the half amplitude point) was 16° in the “equatorial plane,” 
and 24° in the “meridian plane.” The magnetron source, 
with a resonant circuit, and the receiver circuit were housed 
in a hermetically sealed case on the back of the refl ector. 
Rotation of the antenna in the vertical (0° to 90°) and 
horizontal (0° to 400°) planes was remotely controlled. 
These data, together with the terminology, were based on 
the memories of those who heard them from the designers, 
because there is no technical documentation available about 
Rubin and its antennas, or about the Zenit system. 
All of the Rubin equipment (Figure 24) was placed 
on two cars: one for the power supply (a ZIS-6 truck), and 
another one for the electronics (a GAZ-3A truck). On the 
fi rst car, the antenna system was installed on special rails. 
Figure 23. The antenna unit of the single-antenna 
radar “Rubin.”
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When the radar was deployed at a combat position, it was 
rolled out. A control console and a power-generating unit 
were also placed there. That consisted of a three-phase 
generator (PNT-100) and a petrol engine (L-12). The 
modulator unit and the oscilloscope display, together with 
the antenna’s remote-control system, were located on the 
electronics vehicle. The deployment and setting-up of the 
Rubin radar took about three hours. 
In 1943, Rubin was transported to Moscow, where it 
was tested until November. In early 1944, the DC-RA sent 
the Rubin radar to a polar port and naval base in Murmansk, 
according to the agreement with the Red Navy Command. 
From February 1 until March 31, 1944, tests of the radar 
were performed there, led by Usikov. The place for the 
deployment of the radar was at the Kolsky Bay coast in the 
Vayenga Fiord. There, the maximum width of the fi ord was 
4750 m. The bay off ered a variety of testing opportunities, 
due to intensive sea traffi  c: Soviet and foreign navy ships 
and convoys frequently used Murmansk as the single 
non-freezing port in the Soviet Arctic. The following were 
the data regarding detecting airplanes and ships found in 
Usikov’s archive [34].
6.1 Aircraft Location Tests
The tests were normally carried out to detect 
occasional airplanes.
To verify the accuracy of target location, a Hawker 
Hurricane once made a purposeful fl ight along the specifi ed 
route. When fl ying over the sea, it was fi rst detected at a 
distance of 60 km. Determination of the airplane’s position 
at a distance of 40 km was reliable. During the tests, the 
Rubin system was able to detect the airplanes many times, 
which fl ew at very low altitudes (30 m to 50 m).
The average errors of estimating coordinates were 
up to 120 m in range, and no more than 0.8° in azimuth 
and elevation. The time required to measure any of angular 
coordinates never exceeded seven seconds.
6.2 Ship Location Tests
It should be noted that the area of testing was a 
relatively small, open space, and the rocky coast was 5 km 
from the radar. It was rather complicated to make tests 
under such conditions. Despite this, the tests showed that:
• “Rubin” detected all types of ships – cruisers, destroyers, 
transport ships, surfaced submarines, motor boats, and 
even wooden boats – at distances from 500 m to the 
limit of available range, that is, about 5000 m.
• The amplitude of the refl ected signal was dependent 
on the type and size of the ship.
• The amplitudes of the refl ected signals were not stable: 
they changed in time, with the fl uctuation frequency 
depending on the vessel’s size and speed.
• The average errors in the accuracy of determining the 
coordinates of targets were not more than 120 m in 
distance and 0.8° in azimuth.
Usikov was always proud of this achievement, and 
claimed that their team, led by Slutskin, received the best 
results in radar in the USSR at that time. Up to the end of 
the war, Rubin worked in the polar sector of the Soviet-
German front for air and naval surveillance. Nevertheless, 
this unique and promising radar system was never launched 
into mass production. We do not have a clear explanation 
of that fact. 
7. Observation of the 
Atmospheric-Duct Eff ect in 
Bukhara
During the work in Bukhara, LEMO scientists saw a 
mysterious phenomenon, which had never been previously 
reported. In the notes by Usikov [33], it was described the 
following way.
At a time when the tests of the new Rubin radar were 
in full swing, the specifi c eff ect of intensive repetitive noise 
practically spoiled all the work. It was manifested in the 
form of unusually strong refl ections of the type of terrain 
objects, but at all ranges within a radius of 180 km. It was 
a kind of “blindness” of the radar, which suppressed the 
radar signals, refl ected not only from the aircraft but also 
from local objects that acted as landmarks.
Powerful interfering refl ections were observed in 
May to July 1942 by Usikov, Truten, and Vigdorchik. 
The refl ections occurred at diff erent times, usually in the 
afternoon, and their origin was diffi  cult to understand. 
Scanning the antenna beam within the sector of 90° in 
azimuth and 70° in elevation was practically useless. These 
diffi  culties often even forced the researchers to cancel the 
planned tests. 
Figure 24. The full set of the Rubin system.
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This phenomenon had never been observed, either in 
Kharkiv nor in Moscow, but was manifested in Bukhara. 
Usikov and his colleagues therefore named it the “Bukhara 
eff ect.” They guessed that the nature of this phenomenon 
might be due to extreme weather conditions, typical for 
the sandy desert terrain in the vicinity of Bukhara. More 
specifi cally, they concluded that the eff ect of Bukhara 
was caused by a sharp decreasing natural attenuation of 
decimeter waves propagating over the deserts of Kyzyl 
Kum and Kara-Kum. This made it possible to observe 
strong radar refl ections from the local objects, located on 
the all way from radar to the Aktau mountain, 150 km to 
180 km northeast of Bukhara. The inability to avoid these 
refl ections by rotating the antenna was attributed to a 
multi-lobe directional pattern [33, 38]. Recall that the fi rst 
description of the surface-waveguide propagation eff ect 
(an atmospheric duct) was given in 1946 [39]. Inside the 
natural channel (duct), the electromagnetic fi eld propagates 
as a cylindrical wave, instead of as a spherical wave in free 
space, although other mechanisms exist.
As a result, the maximum range of the L-band radar 
under the special circumstances could exceed the range in 
free space by 15 times or more [40]. Normally, the ducting 
eff ect was observed over the sea. According to [41], the 
long-distance record was 1700 miles, between India and 
Arabia.
These observations and the discovery later led 
S. Braude to new results and the creation of the over-the-
horizon radar in Kharkiv, after the war. The work on the 
over-the-horizon radar was started there, using decameter 
and hectometer waves. The work was successfully continued 
at home, after Kharkiv was liberated in 1943. 
In 1952, S. Ya. Braude et al. were awarded the State 
Prize (then, the Stalin Prize) for this work [32].
8. Radar for Long-Range 
Detection
8.1 The First Work in LIPT
In the summer of 1935 A. F. Ioff e (Figure 25), the 
director of LIPT, organized a special laboratory for work 
on the problem of aircraft detection at his institute. D. 
Rozhansky, who earlier worked in Kharkiv, was assigned 
to be head of the laboratory. The reader will remember that 
in Kharkiv, Rozhansky met Yuri Kobzarev, a student of 
KhSU who assisted him with measurements; Kobzarev was 
then invited to Leningrad as his assistant. Rozhansky also 
invited V. I. Bunimovich, another of his pupils from Kharkiv 
(UIPT), to join his lab [53]. Bunimovich (together with his 
teacher) developed the basics of the hollow resonators that 
were important elements of radar transmitting devices. Later, 
Kobzarev recalled [5] that at the beginning of the work in 
Leningrad, Joff e invited him to his offi  ce, and directly said 
that the main task of the laboratory staff  was creating pulse 
technology for radio detection.
When Kobzarev arrived at the laboratory, two 
young people – N. Chernetsov and P. Pogorelko – already 
worked there. They both were students engaged in degree 
theses under the supervision of Rozhansky. Chernetsov 
was engaged in the design of broadband IF amplifi ers, 
and Pogorelko was engaged in the design of a reference 
oscillator to calibrate the receiver. The issues of antenna-
feed device development, plus creating an input converter 
and an output device (later,  the oscilloscope electronic 
device), became the basic tasks of Kobzarev (Figure 26).
It was necessary in the short term (by the fall of 
1935) to produce equipment that would allow obtaining 
Figure 25. Abram F. Ioff e. Figure 26. Yuri B. Kobzarev.
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quantitative characteristics of the refl ection of radio waves 
by aircraft in the real world. The fi rst experiments were 
carried on with a continuous-wave transmitter.
Although the basic equipment was developed in 
Leningrad, the test was planned in the suburb of Moscow. In 
the laboratory of P. Oshchepkov in Moscow, the transmitter 
was developed, operating in continuous-wave mode with 
a carrier wavelength of 3 m to 4 m, modulated by a 1 kHz 
oscillation. In the winter of 1935, the equipment was brought 
to Moscow, where the fi rst major test was held. During this 
test, Kobzarev wrote [5] that a lot of valuable material for 
further work was obtained.
Oshchepkov’s transmitter was located in the building, 
while the antenna was installed on the roof. The receiver 
was of the superheterodyne type, and had a wide bandwidth 
(because it was supposed to be used for receiving pulses). 
The detected signals from the IF output of the receiver 
were used to excite the oscillating circuit of high Q, tuned 
to the transmitter’s modulation frequency.
The set of equipment also included a reference 
oscillator, developed by Pogorelko, which was used to test 
and calibrate the receiver. Both devices were powered by 
batteries, and could easily be transported from place to place.
The receiver was installed at various points in the 
area of the airfi eld near Moscow. An airplane fl ew around 
it in circular paths of diff erent radii and at diff erent heights. 
The signals refl ected from the airplane were manually read 
and recorded.
The radiating and receiving devices in this system 
were located along a line parallel to the border being 
defended. The intersection of this line by the airplane could 
be reliably recorded. Such a system was later developed, 
and in September 1939, put into service under the name 
“RUS-1.”
This was operated in 1940 on the Karelian Isthmus, 
during the Soviet-Finnish war. However, there were 
difficulties with the determination of an airplane’s 
identifi cation, and during the German-Soviet war, the 
system “RUS-1” was relocated to a less-critical part of the 
border, in the Caucasus and in the Far East. It was later 
replaced by the pulsed radar “RUS-2” and “Redut,” which 
had incomparably better quality.
By the end of 1936, the preparatory work for testing 
the pulse method itself was completed in LIPT. At this time, 
the leader of this work, Prof. Rozhansky, passed away. 
Management was transferred to Yu. Kobzarev.
8.2 The First Tests of the Pulse 
Method
The beginning of tests was delayed due to diffi  culties 
with transmitter development in the labs at the Experimental 
Sector of the Air Defense Department, where the person 
responsible was Pavel Oshchepkov. Finally, in March 
1937, the lab staff  from LIPT (four persons) arrived in 
Moscow. In Figure 27, one can see all of the young LIPT 
team on the range of the Experimental Sector in April 
1937. Fortunately, we have some details of the events 
and features of the equipment from the memories of the 
principal participant [5].
After checking their equipment, they waited until 
the powerful transmitter, installed in Moscow, would 
operate. However, they could not receive a signal from 
that transmitter: the task of control by the powerful pulse 
generator had not been resolved in Moscow. Nevertheless, 
the desire to carry out the planned experiments was so great 
that a small team created its own experimental setup for 
radio detection.
They used the reference oscillator added by a control 
oscilloscope, and a modulator that converted the continuous 
radiation into RF pulses. Such a pulse modulator with the 
reference oscillator operated as a master oscillator. They 
hastily constructed an amplifi er circuit for the RF pulses. 
The amplifi ed pulses were applied to the grids of VHF 
vacuum tubes, which were controlled by these pulses. Such 
a pulse generator was a low-power transmitter (about 1 kW 
pulse power), but worked quite stably.
The pulse-repetition frequency was about 1 kHz, and 
the receiving oscilloscope device was designed for exactly 
the same frequency. It had a CRT at the output, and the 
voltage from the last oscillation circuit of the IF amplifi er 
was applied directly to the defl ecting plates of the CRT.
Because of the low radiated power, the maximum 
range of such an experimental setup was rather small. 
Nevertheless, the observations of the RF pulses refl ected 
from the airplane, implemented with the help of this 
Figure 27. A. Maleyev (laboratory assistant), 
Yu. Kobzarev, P. Pogorelko, and N. Chernetsov 
(1937).
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equipment, had a decisive infl uence on the entire course 
of further work.
From a modern viewpoint, this setup was equipped 
with a rather strange display. The oscilloscope’s sweep 
was a helical curve. The beam-defl ection voltage in the 
horizontal plane from a special low-frequency circuit was 
applied directly to the plates, and the beam defl ection in 
the vertical direction was produced by the action of the 
magnetic fi eld of coils in the same circuit. The damped 
oscillations of that circuit were excited by a special device 
that operated synchronously with the sounding pulses, but 
a little bit earlier. This was done in order that the beginning 
of the sounding pulse and the start the refl ected pulse 
could be clearly marked on the sweep (helical curve). 
Knowing the oscillation frequency of the sweeping circuit, 
it was possible to measure the angular distance between 
the beginning of the two pulses with good accuracy. The 
measured angular distance was proportional to the time 
delay of the refl ected pulse, and the distance to the target 
(airplane) was therefore determined.
The receiving device was mounted in a small metal 
cabin, and the antenna was installed on the roof of the cabin. 
The cabin could rotate around a vertical axis. The antenna 
system consisted of two half-wave dipoles, coupled by a 
coaxial feeder with the input of the receiver circuit. A special 
device allowed adjusting the degree of coupling between 
the receiver and each dipole. The relative position of the 
half-wave dipoles, the direction to the transmitter, and the 
direction of the airplane’s route created the conditions for 
mutual compensation (in the input circuit of the receiver) 
of signals coming from the transmitter to the dipoles, 
and adding the signals refl ected from the airplane. The 
arrangement of the equipment in the experiments (in 1937) 
is illustrated in Figure 28. In this fi gure, the transmitting 
antenna consisted of six half-wave dipoles, and the receiving 
antenna consisted of two dipoles spaced by a distance equal 
to the wavelength. The distance between transmitting and 
receiving equipment was very large. 
The fi rst fl ight was on April 15, 1937. Yu. Kobzarev 
recalled: “Our excitement was very great; but we were 
lucky.” The refl ected signals were surely observed at those 
parts of the sweep that were not occupied by “local objects.” 
It was recorded in the photographs in the form of short 
breaks of the helical sweep. A photograph of the screen 
that indicated the refl ected pulse is shown in Figure 29. The 
angular distance between the beginning of the sounding 
pulse and the refl ected pulse determined the range to the 
airplane. In the case given, it was 12.5 km. The altitude 
of the aircraft was given in advance, and in this particular 
case, it was 500 m.
Upon completion of work at the range, it was decided 
to help the Experimental Sector in the development of a 
powerful modulator for the transmitter, based on vacuum 
tubes. By the end of 1937, it was decided to fi nalize the 
one-point radar (monostatic system) with a detection range 
of at least 50 km. The LIPT and Air Defense Department 
Figure 28. The layout of the experiment done by Yu. Kobzarev and his team in 1937 [5].
Figure 29. A photograph of the screen during an ex-
periment in 1937 [5].
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made a relevant contract, but the circumstances suddenly 
changed. In the summer of 1937, the Experimental Sector 
was eliminated. All its equipment and all the cases were 
handed over to the RDTIC-RA (NIIIS), subordinated to 
the DC-RA of PCD. 
P. Oschepkov was arrested. He received 10 years in the 
Gulag. When his term ended and he was released, he never 
returned to the subject of radar, although he later became 
a professor and doctor of technical sciences in another 
fi eld. In his memoir book [1], the second edition of which 
was published in 1976, he was allowed to write only the 
following: “In 1937 I moved away from the work on the 
radar, and to write its further history is not my business.” 
The LIPT was told to bring the work to the end on 
their own. Additional work and responsibility to develop a 
high-power transmitter led to an overload of the team, and 
to the delay of the entire work. Nevertheless, by the end of 
1937, the development of the modulator for the powerful 
transmitter was nearly completed, but the generator operated 
with irregularities. Furthermore, it was necessary to fabricate 
apparatus that could be transported without damage, and 
to solve the problem of transmitting high-frequency pulses 
of high power from a closed space to an outdoor antenna 
in any weather. The fi nal solution to all these issues was 
only completed in the summer of 1938. 
The equipment was manufactured, transported 
to Moscow, and installed in two buildings spaced 
approximately 1 km apart. The buildings belonged to 
RDTIC-RA. One of the buildings was located on a hill, and 
had a small add-on to the top fl oor: a 4 m × 4 m room, with 
access to a small platform on the roof. Another building 
was located in a valley. The receiver and display device 
were located in the superstructure of the fi rst building. The 
receiver was coupled with the antenna installed on the roof. 
The transmitting unit and a similar antenna were located 
in the second building.
When designing the transmitter, it was necessary to 
decide whether to keep a high repetition rate (about 1 kHz), 
on which work was carried out in 1937, or to be satisfi ed 
with a much lower frequency: the frequency of the power 
network (50 Hz). They used 50 Hz, in spite of the obvious 
disadvantage, just because it was much simpler and easy 
to do. Another change was made in the display, with the 
sweep made linear, not helical, as in the previous version. 
A picture of the oscilloscope’s screen in the experiments 
of 1938 is shown in Figure 30. The line of the sweep was 
made to be a wavy line, to simplify measuring the range 
of the target (in the case shown, the range was 30 km).
8.3 Involvement of Industry
According to [5], having received the message about 
the outcome of the tests, Joff e tried in every possible way 
to speed up the diffi  cult issue of bringing the radio industry 
to radio-detection system design and production. The path 
from laboratory setup to industrial design (and even the 
Figure 30. A photograph of the oscilloscope screen 
in the experiments of 1938 [5].
Figure 31. A. B. Slepushkin.
Figure 32. S. P. Rabinovich.
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transportable system, as was required by NIIIS) was not 
easy. The radio plant did not give up taking on this task, 
but they set an unacceptable cost for the fi rst prototype 
and for the duration of its manufacture. Therefore, NIIIS 
decided to make a transportable prototype on their own, 
using the existing equipment of LIPT. They nevertheless 
continued the search for a contractor from industry. Finally, 
an acceptable contractor was found (the R&D Institute of 
Radio-Industry). In April 1939, the Defense Committee of 
the Government made a decision about the development 
(with the participation of employees of LIPT) of two sets 
of transportable stations for the radio detection of airplanes. 
The work was headed by A. B. Slepushkin (Figure 31). 
L.V. Leonov was engaged in transmitter development, S. 
P. Rabinovich (Figure 32) in the oscilloscope indicator, and 
V. V. Tikhomirov (1912-1985) in the receiver.
As a result of these eff orts, in 1939, the NIIIS created 
a prototype with two antennas. It was named “Redut” 
(Figure 33). The units and other equipment of LIPT were 
used in the Redut system. It was a transportable prototype, 
consisting of two automotive vans with the equipment 
inside, and antennas on the roofs. This made it possible to 
conduct comprehensive testing of the system, in particular, 
to determine the dependence of the range of its functioning 
on the height of the airplane. The testing was held in the 
autumn of 1939, in the region of Sebastopol, Crimea. 
Kobzarev took part in those tests. During the tests, it 
was demonstrated that an aircraft located at 150 km from 
the Redut was detected. It became clear that exactly this 
detection range (150 km) was reasonable as a requirement 
for future industrial sets. Shortly after the Redut was tested 
in Sebastopol, the USSR started the war against Finland. 
Because of this, at the initiative of A. Joff e, the Redut 
prototype was installed on the Karelian Isthmus, and during 
the war it was used in military operations.
At the beginning of 1940, two operational systems 
were manufactured by the R&D Institute of Radio-Industry. 
The system consisted of two cabins spaced by 300 m, which 
could synchronously rotate (Figure 34). One of the cabins 
had a transmitter installed in inside, and the other one 
carried the receiver. A more-detailed description was given 
in [2]. The composition of each system (station) included:
•  A generator (50 kW at a wavelength of 4 m) mounted 
inside the cabin, which rotated on the chassis of a ZIS-6 
truck.
•  Receiving equipment and a display with a sweep on 
the CRT screen with a length of 150 mm to 180 mm, 
designed for a detection range of 100 km, in the similarly 
rotating cabin on the second car, a GAZ-3A truck.
•  Two Yagi antennas, rigidly reinforced at each of the 
cabins with synchronous rotation. The antenna had fi ve 
directors, one active dipole, and a refl ector.
•  A power unit of 30 kW to 40 kW power, mounted on 
the GAZ-3A car (the third car of the station).
In July 26, 1940 this “station” was put into service under 
the name “RUS-2.” 
After the fi rst two samples, ten more sets of the same 
station were fabricated. The operational work with them 
was extremely diffi  cult, due to the continuous rotation of the 
cabin, and work on improving the station continued at a rapid 
pace. In particular, a high-frequency current collector was 
developed: a device that allowed the antenna to rotate while 
the equipment, located in the cabin, remained stationary 
(Figure 35). The modulation scheme was also improved.
8.4 Stationary Radar System
During the USSR-Finland war (the Winter War), it 
was decided to build a large fi xed radar system in front 
of Leningrad, with increased operating range, for the air 
defense. The construction of this system was carried out 
extremely rapidly. The radar system consisted of two 
20 m towers, separated by 100 m, on the bank of the lake. 
The towers were booths, with antennas on the roofs. One 
Figure 33. The two-antenna radio-detection system 
“Redut.”
Figure 34. The Redut system, with 
rotating cabin.
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booth housed the generator, while the other booth housed 
a receiving device and oscilloscope. The antennas were 
connected by a steel cable, and could be synchronously 
rotated within a sector of 270°. A house with a room for 
the modulator, the control oscilloscope, and lounges for 
staff  was built next to the tower with a generator.
After the Winter War, the stationary radar station was 
used by LIPT for further research. One of the works carried 
out at the station was testing under real conditions the ways 
proposed by P. Pogorelko to combine the transmitting and 
receiving antennas. Reception was conducted both on the 
transmitting antenna and on the “native” antenna in the 
receiving-antenna tower. The tests, carried out in July 
1940, showed that the signal from the aircraft appeared 
and disappeared on both screens at the same time, which 
proved the possibility of creating a radar with a single 
antenna, with the same range.
Shortly before World War II came to the territory of 
the USSR (June 22, 1941), the government issued a decree, 
awarding the USSR State Prize (Stalin Prize) to a group of 
outstanding scientifi c works and inventions. The staff  of 
the LIPT laboratory, who created the pulse radar system 
(Yu. Kobzarev, P. Pogorelko, and N. Chernetsov) were 
among the awardees. In his memoir, Kobzarev noted: “It is 
regrettable that the initiator of the work, P. K. Oschepkov, 
was not included into the team of awardees.” He was already 
in the Gulag in that time.
9. Airborne Radar Systems
Another work of the R&D Institute of Radio-Industry, 
done in the pre-war and war years, also deserves to be 
commented on: the creation of the airborne radar, providing 
the possibility of guidance to fi ghters at night. Moreover, 
radar stations for detection of aircraft from ships of the 
Navy were developed and found wide application, but will 
not discussed be discussed in this paper. 
The idea of using radar in fi ghter aircraft appeared in 
1939. This question was debated in the Research Institute 
of Air Force in 1939-1940. Once upon a time, in 1939, 
observing the operation of the Redut radar during the 
war with Finland, the chief of the group of the special 
services department of the Air Force Institute, General S. 
A. Danilin, conceived the idea of using radar principles 
onboard of night combat aircraft. Danilin discussed it with 
the leading engineers of his departments. The panelists 
proposed various ideas for creating devices for night 
combat. Some proposed to use infrared equipment, others 
proposed acoustic equipment with a piezo-crystal receiver, 
while a third (engineer E. S. Shtein) suggested the use of 
radio detection. Danilin warmly supported the last proposal, 
which called for the creation of equipment similar to Redut. 
It was this ground-based station that became a prototype of 
an onboard radio detection device for the Air Force [42]. 
The goal was to identify fi ghter-bombers at night 
and under cloud conditions to create a means of night 
fi ghting. Initially, the frequency band of 15 cm to 16 cm 
was proposed, based on a klystron transmitter in pulsed 
mode [43]. The diffi  culty was in placing the equipment on 
the aircraft, as the mass of this equipment in those years 
(together with power supplies) reached 500 kg. Another 
problem was the combination of simultaneous control of 
the aircraft and radar system. In practice, a fi ghter pilot 
could not simultaneously fl y a plane, search (with radar) 
for the enemy, and fi re upon the enemy.
It was decided to install radars not on a single-pilot 
aircraft, but on the two-seater plane: the Pe-2 dive-bomber. 
The team of designers was led by V. V. Tikhomirov 
(Figure 36), and included R. S. Budanov, A. A. Fin, A. R. 
Volpert (1908-1988), and I. I. Volman (all from RDI Radio-
Figure 35. The modifi ed RUS-2 radar 
station.
Figure 36. V. V. Tikhomirov.
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Industry). Initial tactical and technical requirements for 
the fi rst onboard radar at that time were pretty primitive:
•  Detection range (by plane): 4 km to 5 km
• Zone of detection in azimuth: 120°
• Detection zone in elevation angle: 45°
9.1 Gneiss
According to these requirements, a mock-board radar, 
“Gneiss-1,” was created. Due to a lack of the necessary 
klystrons, meter waves were subsequently used. The new 
version was called “Gneiss-2” (Figure 37). It was offi  cially 
taken into service in 1943, but they really started using these 
radars even earlier, in 1942, at Stalingrad. The principal 
parameters of Gneiss-2 were :
• Carrier frequency: 200 MHz
• PRF: 900 Hz
• Pulse duration: 2 μs to 2.5 μs
• Max range: 3.5 km
• Pulse power: 10 kW
• Azimuth error: ±5°
The next airborne radar developed was “Gneiss-5” 
(1944). The maximum range of airplane detection was 7 km. 
It was a step forward: it used new devices and had higher 
reliability. In 1945, airborne radars were also commissioned 
to detect surface ships, and these were developed based 
on Gneiss: “Gneiss-2M” and “Gneiss-5M.” They used the 
new antennas that allowed detecting both air and surface 
targets. The range of “Gneiss-5M” on ships was 10.5 km 
to 36 km, depending on the tonnage of the ship, and the 
coast-detection range was 60 km.
At the end of the war, the fi rst panoramic radar was 
created. It was designed as a radar bombing sight, and also 
for navigation purposes. These radars became the prototypes 
for the navigation radar of civil aviation: RLV-DL, BPR-4G, 
ROS-1. These were followed by the airborne radar of the 
second generation, the meteorological and navigation 
radars. The fi rst of these was “Groza” (Thunderstorm), 
developed in Leningrad in the early 1960s. For many years, 
it was produced in Kiev at the “Communist” plant. The 
development of new weather radars and their production 
was subsequently fully transferred to Kiev, where the 
new family of “Groza-M” radars was created. The next 
step was the development of radars with digital signal 
processing and color television images, the fi rst of which 
was MNRLS-85, established in Kiev (the chief designer 
of which was Volodymyr Belkin).
10. Identifi cation Friend or Foe
All radio-detection systems mentioned above 
were in fact autonomous primary radars. The history of 
secondary radars (i.e., systems consisting of interrogators 
and transponders) also began during World War II. After 
solving the problem of long-range detection of aircraft 
and equipping air defense with radars, an additional task 
emerged. Not only was detection of an aircraft important, it 
was also necessary to determine the identity of the detected 
airplane: either “friend or foe.”
In May 1940, DC-RA and LIPT signed a contract 
for the development of the airplane responder, which had 
to work with the ground-based radar “Redut.” Kobzarev 
recovered the stationary radar that was built on the outskirts 
of Leningrad, to be used by LIPT for further research. In 
particular, the experiments were carried out to establish a 
system for recognition of own aircraft. Based on the study 
of the scattering of radio waves by planes and estimates of 
the radar cross section, it was supposed that by placing a 
half-wave dipole on the airplane, and connecting it at the 
middle in a pre-determined order, one could cause a change 
in the magnitude of the refl ected signal in the same order. 
Experiments carried out to implement the idea of such a 
“passive identifi cation device” failed. 
A group of experts of LIPT – N. Alekseyev, D. 
Malyarov, and Yu. Korovin, reinforced by S. Braude from 
UIPT (Kharkiv) – then [2] developed an “active responder.” 
This was, a device that generated and emitted a pulse in 
response to the sounding waveform that came to the airplane 
equipped with such an active responder. It was a kind of a 
regenerative receiver. This device was successfully tested 
in the last pre-war days.
Figure 37. The complete 
set of Gneiss-2.
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In 1942, the contract was signed with one of the 
radio-industry factories, and mass production of “friend or 
foe” devices began in 1943. This was an example of a very 
tight schedule for the development and batch production 
of airborne radio-electronic equipment.
The principle of this identifi cation was the fact that 
an impulse, visible on the screen of a ground-based display 
near the refl ected radar signal, was supplied as a recognition 
signal. That is, own airplanes equipped with the responder 
were displayed as a dual mark. The weight of such a device 
was 3.5 kg, the power consumption was up to 100 W, and 
the wavelength was 4 m to 4.3 m.
Such responders could be considered the prototypes 
of modern aircraft transponders, widely used in air traffi  c 
control (ATC) systems. These allow the air traffi  c controller 
to automatically receive additional information about 
aircraft that are in the service area.
11. Compression of RF
Wideband Pulses
11.1 Establishment of ARTA
After the war, in 1946, the Artillery Radio-Technical 
Academy (ARTA) was established in Kharkiv. It later 
became the most powerful radar school in the Soviet 
Union. One of the most important tasks in the early years 
of pulse radar was the problem of clutter elimination. 
The principle of moving-target indication (MTI) with a 
delay-line canceller was already known. At the end of the 
1940s, Yakov D. Shirman (1919-2019) (Figure 38), then 
a young teacher at ARTA, tried to more deeply understand 
the issues of MTI in his lectures for the students [44]. This 
perhaps helped him suggest the transition from a single 
delay-line canceller to double- and multiple-delay-line 
cancellers. In 1951, he obtained patent No. 13855, USSR, 
Ministry of Defense (Figure 39) on an MTI system with 
a multiple-delay-line canceller. The eff ectiveness of the 
MTI system was signifi cantly improved. This invention 
was very quickly implemented in the P-12 radar system, 
and a little later, in the anti-missile system C-75, and in 
many other radars [44, 45].
11.2 The Problem of Improving 
Range Resolution
A contradiction arose between the tasks of increasing 
the range of operation and the range resolution. This seemed 
very serious in the 1950s. At that time, rectangular RF pulses 
without intra-pulse modulation were used in pulse radars. To 
increase the range of the radar it was necessary to increase the 
energy of the sounding pulse. To do this, the pulse duration 
had to be increased, the peak power always being limited. 
In turn, increasing the duration of such an RF pulse led to 
a degradation of the range resolution: both a theoretical and 
a practical problem. Ya. Shirman proposed two solutions 
in 1955 [46, 47] as simple approaches to increasing range 
resolution in a secondary receiving channel. In both cases, a 
long RF pulse was converted with the help of linear circuits 
into two short pulses. In addition, a pair of long pulses was 
converted , according to the superposition principle into 
Figure 39. Patent No. 13855 (Ministry of De-
fense, 1951).
Figure 38. Yakov D. Shirman (circa 1950).
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two pairs of non-overlapping short pulses that were actually 
wideband. It was a radar with a two-channel receiver, where 
one channel was for long range, and a secondary channel 
was for high resolution. This approach was confi rmed by 
laboratory and live experiments [45]. However, the thought 
that then appeared in the scientist’s mind was that perhaps 
it would be better to directly radiate wideband sounding 
pulses, in order to simultaneously solve both tasks with 
the help of a single matched receiving channel: to reach 
increasing resolution without loss in range. Simultaneously, 
a theoretical problem was important: how to modernize the 
Woodward theory of time-frequency resolution in order 
to cover the described results of time super-resolution? It 
was really important to understand this matter, because it 
could open up the opportunity to also assess the prospects 
of angular super-resolution.
Yakov D. Shirman was an ambitious scientist, but 
also a very modest and extremely honest person. He also 
paid attention to the history of radar. In his papers and 
personal conversations, he indicated some predecessors 
whose lectures, talks, or work contained some ideas that 
could be related to his achievements. He personally prepared 
and supervised 20 Doctors of Science and 45 PhD holders 
in radar-related fi elds. He created an exclusively strong 
team of researchers. Of course, his pupils made great 
contributions to developing his research and development 
work. Unfortunately, it is impossible to mention many names 
in this paper. However, the paper written by Shirman himself, 
together with his pupils [45], contained a lot of references.
11.3 Compression of RF 
Wideband Pulses
Single-channel matched fi ltering was fi rst proposed 
by Ya. D. Shirman for random phase-shift-keyed signals 
in 1955 [45]. He then developed it for deterministic linear 
frequency-modulated (LFM) signals in July 1956 [48]. The 
latter invention described a method of increasing radar range 
resolution using frequency-modulated sounding pulses, 
and the device to implement this method. In the device, 
to compress the duration of receiving (refl ected) pulses, 
the receiver included a compression fi lter (for example) 
at intermediate frequency. This fi lter was implemented as 
a tapped delay line with continuous or discrete tapping, 
and capacitive, inductive, or conductive coupling with the 
delay line. In 1956, the principle of compression of linear 
frequency-modulated pulses was checked in the experiment 
done by Shirman’s pupils, B. V. Naydenov, V. N. Manzhos, 
and Z. A. Vainoris. They designed a matched fi lter based 
on a spiral delay line. It was implemented as a dielectric 
rod, and located in a glass tube. Discrete capacitive pickups 
were arranged. The distances between them were diff erent. 
They were proportional to the changing semi-period of the 
pulse-response characteristics (Figure 40)
The initial FM pulse, with a duration 5  μs and 
a frequency deviation of 4 MHz (±2 MHz) at a mean 
frequency of 3 MHz, was applied to the input of such a 
matched fi lter (MF). At the output of the matched fi lter, 
the pulse was compressed six to 10 times in time, as was 
clearly seen from the oscillograms. However, it had the 
level of remaining (sidelobes) considerably higher than the 
calculation, due to the absence of careful coordination of 
the fi lter’s pulse response with the signal’s shape.
The results were discussed with leading experts and 
caused great interest. Despite the doubts of some of the 
experts, this approach immediately received intensive 
development.
In the summer of 1959, based on the P-12 Radar 
System, the prototype of the VHF-band radar with linear-
frequency-modulated pulse compression was created and 
tested in the modes of aircraft and missile detection, under 
the leadership of Ya. D. Shirman (Figure 41). The sounding 
pulse duration was 6 μs at a spectrum width of 5 MHz. 
After processing, the pulse duration was decreased 30 times 
and the range resolution was correspondingly improved, 
without a practical decrease in the range of operation. At the 
end of 1959, on the same basis, a new version of the radar 
prototype was created, with a pulse duration of 100 μs at 
the same average pulse power. As a result of the coherent 
processing of the received signal, the range of operation 
was increased two times, while maintaining the same range 
resolution [44, 45]. 
Figure 40a. The matched fi lter.
Figure 40b. The result of the 
pulse compression in 1956.
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The theory of pulse-compression fi lters with discrete 
irregular tapping was later described in a book [49]. It was 
developed based on the theory of pulse communications 
published much earlier by Shirman (1946). Compression 
fi lters were practically implemented using electrical (V. N. 
Manzhos, Yu. A. Koval, N. M. Ivakhnenko) or ultrasonic (V. 
V. Trubnikov) delay lines. The phenomenon of dispersion 
in delay lines was used; weighted processing was applied 
to minimize the sidelobe level of compressed pulses. 
Compression fi lters were also developed and built for 
processing phase-shift-keyed impulse signals.
 
The invention of wideband-pulse compression 
by matched fi ltering was one of the most signifi cant 
contributions to radar theory and technique after WW II. 
It was independently done in Ukraine (then a part of the 
USSR), and practically at the same time as in the USA 
(Charles Cook, 1955, published in 1968 [50]). Shirman did 
it in a much more sophisticated and eff ective way.
11.4 The First Super-Wideband 
Radar
Widening the bandwidth of the sounding waveform 
up to 100 times relative to then-existing radar systems 
made it possible to signifi cantly improve both the range 
resolution and the accuracy of range measurement with 
matched signal processing. The first full-scale live 
experiment of the surveillance of aircraft with a super-
wideband linear-frequency-modulated-pulse radar were 
made during 1962-64, using the S-band radar PRV-10 
[32, 44]. A unique (for those times) compression fi lter for 
linear-frequency-modulated pulses of 2 μs at a bandwidth 
of 72 MHz, based on a coaxial cable, was developed by 
V. B. Almazov and D. A. Tsursky, who were students of 
Prof. Shirman (Figure 42).
Experiments with such a radar showed a range of 
airplane detection up to 110 km. An actual range resolution 
in the automatic lock-in mode of 3.0 m to 4.5 m at 65 km. 
This provided resolution even of elements of a target in the 
air, and observation of the range image (profi le) of a target.
The Pioneer Award Committee of the IEEE 
Aerospace and Electronic Systems Society named Yakov 
D. Shirman as the recipient of the Pioneer Award, with 
the following citation: “For the independent discovery of 
matched fi ltering, adaptive fi ltering, and high-resolution 
pulse compression for an entire generation of Russian 
and Ukrainian radars.” Formal presentation was made at 
the International Radar Conference, Bordeaux, France on 
October 2009. Six months later, Yakov Shirman passed 
away in the 91st year of his life. 
Figure 42b. The compression ratio was 144 in 1961.
Figure 41. The P-12 radar system, where the 
fi rst pulse compression was implemented.
Figure 42a. D. Tsursky and V. Almazov, together 
with Ya. Shirman (in the middle), shown tuning the 
compressing fi lter. 
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12. Conclusions
In spite of the very fair general opinion of science as 
an international fi eld of human activity, the development 
of modern radar in diff erent countries was independent, 
and covered by a curtain of secrecy, because of obvious 
military applications. 
Soviet radar achievements were disclosed later 
than those in western countries. Inside the USSR, the 
achievements in the R&D fi eld obtained in Ukrainian 
institutions were never considered as such, because 
it was a single state, while in sports and culture there 
were quite offi  cial parades and competitions between 
the “Socialist Republics.” This paper has clarifi ed the 
valuable contributions of Soviet and Ukrainian engineers 
and scientists to the early developments in the fi eld of 
radio detection, or radar. These contributions were really 
signifi cant and independent, and many aspects of the 
radio detection of airplanes were developed at least not 
later than in other countries. The complicated history of 
microwave and radar technology in the Soviet Union – in 
particular, of the signifi cant Ukrainian contribution – was 
a good basis for the modern scientifi c and technological 
achievements [51, 52].
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